# Briefing — week to Friday, 2 October 2026

*Disinflation with steady growth keeps the regime benign, and persistence is high. But credit spreads widened across emerging, European and US high yield, and high-yield total returns fell. Reduce low-quality credit risk; take duration and quality instead.*

## Regime

The macro regime stays supportive, and the classification is not a close call. The current label is Goldilocks, with the modal probability well clear of the contraction alternative, and the transition estimate puts almost all the weight on staying in Goldilocks next period. That matters for positioning because a regime call with a high persistence estimate behaves differently from one sitting near a boundary: it allows risk to be taken in the direction of the label without an immediate hedge against reclassification. The prior label was Overheating, so the move has been toward cooler inflation, not weaker demand. The distinction is the whole argument. A transition out of overheating that runs through demand destruction shows up as a falling growth gap and a labour market that stops adding workers; a transition that runs through inflation alone shows up as a narrowing price gap with activity intact. The pack describes the second. The inflation gap is firmly negative while the growth gap is positive, and the strength now visible in payrolls and the growth nowcast sits comfortably with that reading: a small measured gap against potential coexists with activity indicators at the top of their recent ranges.

The regime signal is strong enough to carry duration and quality, and not strong enough to justify holding low-quality credit through wider spreads. A benign regime label tells you the central case, not the distribution of outcomes in the tail, and the tail this week is sitting in credit.

## Monetary policy

Monetary policy is not the binding variable this week; the regulatory channel is, and it argues for taking duration in Treasuries rather than carry in low-quality credit. Bowman's assessment of the recalibrated enhanced supplementary leverage ratio describes dealers with materially more balance sheet, reporting that the reforms have "improved Treasury market functioning and strengthened its resilience to stress by relaxing regulatory balance sheet constraints"<sup>1</sup>.

The mechanism is specific: dealers "increased their Treasury market positions, as all of the largest banks benefited from significantly greater headroom"<sup>2</sup>, and the gains concentrated in previously constrained firms. That concentration is the part that bears on portfolio construction. Capacity added at firms that were already unconstrained would change little, because those dealers were not the ones stepping back when markets moved against them. Capacity added where the constraint was binding changes the behaviour of the marginal intermediary in exactly the conditions that matter, which is when positions have to be absorbed quickly. Bowman also points to "narrower bid-ask spreads, reduced intraday volatility during auction cycles, calmer funding conditions"<sup>3</sup>.

Deeper dealer capacity in government bonds lowers the cost of holding duration through a period when credit is repricing wider, which strengthens the case for rotating risk from spread into rates and quality. That support is structural rather than cyclical, so it should persist. A balance-sheet change of this kind does not reverse with the next data release, which is why I weight it more heavily than a single week of price action.

## Rates and curve

Take duration at the front and intermediate part of the curve rather than the long end. The two-year fell to 4.78%<sup>4</sup>, down 3bp<sup>5</sup> on the week, while the ten-year rose +7bp<sup>6</sup> to 5.24%<sup>7</sup> and the thirty-year rose +12bp<sup>8</sup> to 5.61%<sup>9</sup>, a steepening of +9bp<sup>10</sup> in the two-to-ten spread to 0.45%<sup>11</sup>. The shape of the move is more informative than its size: the front end anchored while the back end gave ground, which is the signature of a curve repricing the compensation demanded for holding long-dated risk rather than the expected path of policy.

The move was real, not inflationary: ten-year breakevens rose +2bp<sup>12</sup> to 2.36%<sup>13</sup>, inside a fifty-two-week range whose high is 2.50%<sup>14</sup>, while the ten-year real yield rose +5bp<sup>15</sup> to 2.88%<sup>16</sup>. Had the steepening come with breakevens pushing toward the top of their range, the regime reading would be under pressure and the case for duration weaker. It did not. The upper bound of the policy target was unchanged at 4.00%<sup>17</sup>.

A term-premium-led steepening with contained inflation expectations is consistent with the benign regime and argues for owning quality duration in the belly rather than the long bond. The belly captures most of the carry available without taking the part of the curve most exposed to supply.

## Credit

Cut low-quality credit exposure and hold the risk in investment grade instead. High-yield spreads widened to 3.24%<sup>18</sup>, a one-week move of +31bp<sup>19</sup> and +56bp<sup>20</sup> over four weeks, leaving the series close to its twelve-month high of 3.46%<sup>21</sup>. The four-week figure is the one that should decide the trade: a single week of widening can be positioning, but a sustained move that carries a spread series toward the top of its annual range is a repricing of default compensation. The high-yield total return index fell -0.9%<sup>22</sup> on the week to 1,863.13<sup>23</sup>, within reach of its twelve-month low of 1,829.93<sup>24</sup>, so the spread move has been large enough to overwhelm the carry the asset class pays.

Investment grade moved far less: the spread widened +5bp<sup>25</sup> to 0.86%<sup>26</sup>, still below its twelve-month high of 0.94%<sup>27</sup>, and the corporate total return index slipped -0.5%<sup>28</sup>. The gap between the two moves is the evidence that this is a quality event rather than a credit cycle turning. The damage is concentrated in the lowest-quality tier rather than spread across credit, which narrows the warning rather than overturning the benign regime. Investment grade is where I would hold corporate risk while the lower tier finds a clearing level.

## Equities

Equity markets did not confirm the credit stress, which narrows the risk signal to credit alone. The broad US large-cap index ended the week at 7,722.72<sup>29</sup>, down -0.3%<sup>30</sup>, and sits below its fifty-two-week high of 7,798.99<sup>31</sup>. The Nasdaq Composite rose +0.5%<sup>32</sup> to 27,190.86<sup>33</sup>, close to its own fifty-two-week high of 27,244.28<sup>34</sup>. Equity and credit hold claims on the same corporate cash flows, so a genuine deterioration in the outlook for those cash flows would be visible in both. It is visible in one.

Index-level calm is consistent with a benign regime, so the case for cutting low-quality credit rests on spreads rather than equities. The honest reading is that the equity market is not corroborating the credit move, which lowers my conviction that this is the beginning of a broader risk event and raises my conviction that it is confined to the weakest issuers.

## FX and commodities

Energy cuts against the benign regime at the margin, and keeps the case for quality duration from resting on commodities. WTI rose to 96.16<sup>35</sup> a barrel, up +10.93<sup>36</sup> on the week, while Brent eased -2.05<sup>37</sup> to 113.96<sup>38</sup> and is up +11.72<sup>39</sup> over four weeks. The two benchmarks moved in opposite directions on the week but in the same direction over the month, and the monthly direction is the one that feeds through to headline prices. The dollar is firm: the broad index at 120.33<sup>40</sup>, up +2.26<sup>41</sup> over four weeks, which partially offsets the energy impulse for dollar-based consumers and tightens conditions for borrowers funded in dollars.

Firm energy is the main risk to the disinflation path. If energy continues higher from here the negative inflation gap narrows and the regime call weakens, which is the single development most likely to force a change in this positioning.

## Macro data

The macro data support staying long duration and quality rather than reaching for credit risk. Core PCE stands at 130.46<sup>42</sup>, an index high for the past year, but the rise from the year's low of 127.36<sup>43</sup> is modest in pace. A price index at a high is unremarkable, since indices of that construction rise most of the time; the pace is what the regime call turns on, and the pace is slow.

Payrolls at 159,044<sup>44</sup> thousand and unemployment at 4.20%<sup>45</sup>, against a range low of 4.10%<sup>46</sup>, describe a labour market that is firm rather than tightening further. That combination is the one most consistent with wage pressure that neither reaccelerates nor collapses. The growth nowcast at 3.68%<sup>47</sup> sits at the top of its range, yet consumer sentiment at 51.70<sup>48</sup> is well below its high of 56.60<sup>49</sup>, and the divergence between measured activity and household attitudes limits how much of the nowcast strength should be extrapolated forward.

That combination argues for a growth gap only slightly above trend, not an acceleration. Data of this shape gives the central bank no reason to move in either direction quickly, which is itself supportive of front-end duration.

## United Kingdom

Take UK duration at the intermediate point rather than the long end. Ten-year gilts rose to 5.37%<sup>50</sup>, up 4bp<sup>51</sup> on the week and 30bp<sup>52</sup> over four weeks, just under the one-year high of 5.38%<sup>53</sup>; twenty-year yields reached 5.73%<sup>54</sup>. Bank Rate was unchanged at 3.75%<sup>55</sup> and sterling fell to 1.3250<sup>56</sup>.

The pattern matches the US: an unchanged policy rate, a long end under pressure, and a currency that softened rather than firming as yields rose. A currency that does not reward higher long-dated yields is the clearest sign that the move is about the quantity of paper to be absorbed rather than about the return on holding it. The long end is being repriced for supply, not for policy. I would own gilts where the policy anchor still dominates and avoid the part of the curve that has to clear issuance.

## Euro area

European high yield confirms the credit signal rather than contradicting it: spreads widened to 3.17%<sup>57</sup>, a move of +38bp<sup>58</sup> on the week and +51bp<sup>59</sup> over four weeks, pushing toward the year high of 3.37%<sup>60</sup>. The move is of the same order as the US move and over the same horizon, which removes the possibility that the widening reflects something specific to one issuer base or one index construction.

Rates went the other way, with the two-year at 3.11%<sup>61</sup>, down 14bp<sup>62</sup>, and the ten-year at 3.59%<sup>63</sup>. Government duration rallied while corporate risk sold off, which is the clean separation of the two exposures that the regime call implies. Duration in euro government bonds is the better expression of the benign regime than European high yield. The simultaneity across regions tells me this is a global repricing of low-quality credit, not a local accident.

## Japan

Japan is the clearest case for duration risk being repriced upward rather than down. The ten-year yield rose to 3.09%<sup>64</sup>, a fifty-two-week high, with the thirty-year at 4.12%<sup>65</sup> and the two-year at 1.94%<sup>66</sup>. The Bank of Japan said it will "continue to raise the policy interest rate and adjust the degree of monetary accommodation"<sup>67</sup>, which removes the ambiguity: the yield move has official sanction behind it and is not a market overshoot waiting to be faded.

Equities absorbed it, the Nikkei gaining +2.9%<sup>68</sup> on the week, which says the rise in yields is being read as a response to adequate nominal growth rather than as a tightening into weakness.

Hold duration outside Japan, not in it. Buying duration against a central bank that has stated its direction is the one position in this piece I would refuse outright.

## Canada

Canadian duration is a clean way to take the quality trade. The policy rate held at 2.25%<sup>69</sup>, the two-year fell 8bp<sup>70</sup> to 3.27%<sup>71</sup> and the ten-year was unchanged at 3.94%<sup>72</sup>. Unemployment at 6.40%<sup>73</sup> sits at its one-year low, so the labour market gives the central bank no reason to ease into weakness.

Macklem noted that elevated oil and fuel prices have "pushed inflation above the 2% target"<sup>74</sup>, which limits the easing on offer. The energy impulse visible in the commodity section therefore arrives here as a direct constraint on policy rather than as a background risk. The front end is close to fully priced here. The intermediate part of the Canadian curve is the better place to add, since it carries the quality exposure without depending on cuts that the inflation backdrop will not deliver.

## Emerging markets

Emerging market credit confirms the case for cutting low-quality risk. EM corporate spreads widened to 1.61%<sup>75</sup>, up +21bp<sup>76</sup> on the week, and EM high yield widened to 3.41%<sup>77</sup>, up +48bp<sup>78</sup>. The lower tier moved by more than the broad corporate index, repeating within emerging markets the same quality split seen in the US.

Currencies did not contradict the benign macro backdrop: the broad EM dollar index sits at 128.56<sup>79</sup> and EM equity volatility eased -0.40<sup>80</sup> to 26.69<sup>81</sup>. A genuine growth scare in emerging markets shows up first in the currency and in equity volatility, and neither is confirming. The stress is in credit quality, not in growth. That reading supports cutting the weakest emerging market credit without reducing emerging market exposure overall.

## Fiscal and trade policy

Policy this week carried no new fiscal or trade impulse that changes the credit call. The administration's output was a manufacturing proclamation claiming "the greatest reshoring of American manufacturing in our Nation’s history"<sup>82</sup> on the back of tariffs, and an executive order on tick and mosquito control. Neither alters funding conditions or spread dynamics, and neither changes the supply of government paper that the long end is absorbing.

This absence is evidence, not a gap in the record. Had the week produced a tariff escalation or a funding announcement, the widening in high yield would admit a policy explanation and the correct response would be to reduce risk broadly rather than selectively. The absence of a fiscal or trade shock leaves the widening in high yield as an internal credit event, which is why we fund duration and quality from the low-quality sleeve rather than from risk overall.

## What changed

The change is in where risk is priced, not in the level of rates. The earlier reading asked to "Stay short duration, favour the front end only where carry compensates, and keep equity risk modest"<sup>83</sup>; this week the pressure moved into credit. US high yield spreads widened to 3.24%<sup>18</sup>, a move of +31bp<sup>19</sup>, and emerging market high yield widened +48bp<sup>78</sup>. Reduce low-quality credit exposure.

The front-end case survives. The two-year fell -3bp<sup>5</sup> while the thirty-year rose +12bp<sup>8</sup>, and the policy rate was unchanged at 4.00%<sup>17</sup>. The part of the curve the earlier reading favoured is the part that held, and the part that sold off is the part the recommendation never asked the portfolio to own.

Only a renewed rise in front-end yields would undo this. Short of that, the position is to carry duration in the belly, hold corporate risk in investment grade, and let the lowest-quality tier clear without us.

## Citations

1. Bowman, Modernizing Financial Regulation: Initial Observations from eSLR ¶12 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bowman20261001a.htm (2026-10-01)
2. Bowman, Modernizing Financial Regulation: Initial Observations from eSLR ¶14 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bowman20261001a.htm (2026-10-01)
3. Bowman, Modernizing Financial Regulation: Initial Observations from eSLR ¶20 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bowman20261001a.htm (2026-10-01)
4. DGS2.latest = DGS2[2026-10-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS2 (2026-10-02)
5. DGS2.chg_1w = DGS2[2026-10-01] - DGS2[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS2 (2026-10-02)
6. DGS10.chg_1w = DGS10[2026-10-01] - DGS10[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS10 (2026-10-02)
7. DGS10.latest = DGS10[2026-10-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS10 (2026-10-02)
8. DGS30.chg_1w = DGS30[2026-10-01] - DGS30[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS30 (2026-10-02)
9. DGS30.latest = DGS30[2026-10-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS30 (2026-10-02)
10. T10Y2Y.chg_1w = T10Y2Y[2026-10-02] - T10Y2Y[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y (2026-10-02)
11. T10Y2Y.latest = T10Y2Y[2026-10-02] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y (2026-10-02)
12. T10YIE.chg_1w = T10YIE[2026-10-02] - T10YIE[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIE (2026-10-02)
13. T10YIE.latest = T10YIE[2026-10-02] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIE (2026-10-02)
14. T10YIE.hi_52w = max(T10YIE[2025-10-06..2026-10-02]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIE (2026-10-02)
15. DFII10.chg_1w = DFII10[2026-10-01] - DFII10[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFII10 (2026-10-02)
16. DFII10.latest = DFII10[2026-10-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFII10 (2026-10-02)
17. DFEDTARU.latest = DFEDTARU[2026-10-02] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU (2026-10-02)
18. BAMLH0A0HYM2.latest = BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-10-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-10-01)
19. BAMLH0A0HYM2.chg_1w = BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-10-01] - BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-10-01)
20. BAMLH0A0HYM2.chg_4w = BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-10-01] - BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-10-01)
21. BAMLH0A0HYM2.hi_52w = max(BAMLH0A0HYM2[2025-10-06..2026-10-01]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-10-01)
22. BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV.pct_1w = (BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-10-01] - BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-09-25]) / BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-09-25] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV (2026-10-01)
23. BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV.latest = BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-10-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV (2026-10-01)
24. BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV.lo_52w = min(BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2025-10-06..2026-10-01]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV (2026-10-01)
25. BAMLC0A0CM.chg_1w = BAMLC0A0CM[2026-10-01] - BAMLC0A0CM[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-10-01)
26. BAMLC0A0CM.latest = BAMLC0A0CM[2026-10-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-10-01)
27. BAMLC0A0CM.hi_52w = max(BAMLC0A0CM[2025-10-06..2026-10-01]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-10-01)
28. BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV.pct_1w = (BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-10-01] - BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-09-25]) / BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-09-25] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV (2026-10-01)
29. S&P 500 index level — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-10-03)
30. SP500.pct_1w = (SP500[2026-10-02] - SP500[2026-09-25]) / SP500[2026-09-25] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-10-03)
31. SP500.hi_52w = max(SP500[2025-10-06..2026-10-02]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-10-03)
32. NASDAQCOM.pct_1w = (NASDAQCOM[2026-10-02] - NASDAQCOM[2026-09-25]) / NASDAQCOM[2026-09-25] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-10-02)
33. NASDAQCOM.latest = NASDAQCOM[2026-10-02] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-10-02)
34. NASDAQCOM.hi_52w = max(NASDAQCOM[2025-10-06..2026-10-02]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-10-02)
35. DCOILWTICO.latest = DCOILWTICO[2026-09-29] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILWTICO (2026-09-30)
36. DCOILWTICO.chg_1w = DCOILWTICO[2026-09-29] - DCOILWTICO[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILWTICO (2026-09-30)
37. DCOILBRENTEU.chg_1w = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-29] - DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-30)
38. DCOILBRENTEU.latest = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-29] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-30)
39. DCOILBRENTEU.chg_4w = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-29] - DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-30)
40. DTWEXBGS.latest = DTWEXBGS[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXBGS (2026-09-28)
41. DTWEXBGS.chg_4w = DTWEXBGS[2026-09-25] - DTWEXBGS[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXBGS (2026-09-28)
42. PCEPILFE.latest = PCEPILFE[2026-08-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPILFE (2026-09-30)
43. PCEPILFE.lo_52w = min(PCEPILFE[2025-11-01..2026-08-01]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPILFE (2026-09-30)
44. PAYEMS.latest = PAYEMS[2026-09-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS (2026-10-02)
45. UNRATE.latest = UNRATE[2026-09-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE (2026-10-02)
46. UNRATE.lo_52w = min(UNRATE[2025-11-01..2026-09-01]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE (2026-10-02)
47. GDPNOW.latest = GDPNOW[2026-07-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPNOW (2026-10-01)
48. UMCSENT.latest = UMCSENT[2026-08-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UMCSENT (2026-08-28)
49. UMCSENT.hi_52w = max(UMCSENT[2025-11-01..2026-08-01]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UMCSENT (2026-08-28)
50. GB10Y.latest = GB10Y[2026-09-30] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-10-02)
51. GB10Y.chg_1w = GB10Y[2026-09-30] - GB10Y[2026-09-25] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-10-02)
52. GB10Y.chg_4w = GB10Y[2026-09-30] - GB10Y[2026-09-04] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-10-02)
53. GB10Y.hi_52w = max(GB10Y[2025-10-06..2026-09-30]) — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-10-02)
54. GB20Y.latest = GB20Y[2026-09-30] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-10-02)
55. GBPOL.latest = GBPOL[2026-10-01] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-10-02)
56. DEXUSUK.latest = DEXUSUK[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXUSUK (2026-09-28)
57. BAMLHE00EHYIOAS.latest = BAMLHE00EHYIOAS[2026-10-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHE00EHYIOAS (2026-10-01)
58. BAMLHE00EHYIOAS.chg_1w = BAMLHE00EHYIOAS[2026-10-01] - BAMLHE00EHYIOAS[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHE00EHYIOAS (2026-10-01)
59. BAMLHE00EHYIOAS.chg_4w = BAMLHE00EHYIOAS[2026-10-01] - BAMLHE00EHYIOAS[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHE00EHYIOAS (2026-10-01)
60. BAMLHE00EHYIOAS.hi_52w = max(BAMLHE00EHYIOAS[2025-10-06..2026-10-01]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHE00EHYIOAS (2026-10-01)
61. EA2Y.latest = EA2Y[2026-10-01] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-10-03)
62. EA2Y.chg_1w = EA2Y[2026-10-01] - EA2Y[2026-09-25] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-10-03)
63. EA10Y.latest = EA10Y[2026-10-01] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-10-03)
64. JP10Y.latest = JP10Y[2026-10-01] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-10-03)
65. JP30Y.latest = JP30Y[2026-10-01] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-10-03)
66. JP2Y.latest = JP2Y[2026-10-01] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-10-03)
67. Bank of Japan monetary policy decision, 2026-09-18 ¶5 — https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/mpmdeci/mpr_2026/k260918a.pdf (2026-09-18)
68. NIKKEI225.pct_1w = (NIKKEI225[2026-10-02] - NIKKEI225[2026-09-25]) / NIKKEI225[2026-09-25] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NIKKEI225 (2026-10-02)
69. CAPOL.latest = CAPOL[2026-10-01] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-10-03)
70. CA2Y.chg_1w = CA2Y[2026-10-01] - CA2Y[2026-09-25] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-10-03)
71. CA2Y.latest = CA2Y[2026-10-01] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-10-03)
72. CA10Y.latest = CA10Y[2026-10-01] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-10-03)
73. LRUNTTTTCAM156S.latest = LRUNTTTTCAM156S[2026-08-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LRUNTTTTCAM156S (2026-09-15)
74. Adapting to structural forces, navigating uncertainty ¶5 — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2026/09/adapting-structural-forces-navigating-uncertainty/ (2026-09-21)
75. BAMLEMCBPIOAS.latest = BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-10-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMCBPIOAS (2026-10-01)
76. BAMLEMCBPIOAS.chg_1w = BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-10-01] - BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMCBPIOAS (2026-10-01)
77. BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS.latest = BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-10-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS (2026-10-01)
78. BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS.chg_1w = BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-10-01] - BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS (2026-10-01)
79. DTWEXEMEGS.latest = DTWEXEMEGS[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXEMEGS (2026-09-28)
80. VXEEMCLS.chg_1w = VXEEMCLS[2026-10-01] - VXEEMCLS[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/VXEEMCLS (2026-10-01)
81. VXEEMCLS.latest = VXEEMCLS[2026-10-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/VXEEMCLS (2026-10-01)
82. National Manufacturing Day, 2026 ¶3 — https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/10/national-manufacturing-day-2026/ (2026-10-02)
83. institutional_weekly run 26 (2026-09-11)