# Briefing — week to Friday, 11 September 2026

*The regime is overheating and persistent. Front-end and intermediate sovereign yields rose sharply across Europe, Canada and the UK, confirming policy stays tight. Stay short duration, favour the front end only where carry compensates, and keep equity risk modest.*

## Regime

The regime classification has not changed: the economy remains in the overheating state it occupied in the prior period, and the probability mass sits overwhelmingly on staying there. The transition estimates leave contraction, goldilocks and stagflation as remote alternatives over the coming period, so the persistence assumption is the one to underwrite. That argues for keeping duration short rather than treating the yield move as an overshoot to be faded.

The practical content of a persistence assumption is that the portfolio should be built for the state we are in, not for the state we expect to arrive at some unspecified later date. An overheating regime pays the owner of short-dated claims and penalises the owner of long-dated ones, because the pressure on policy is upward and the pressure on term premium is upward with it. Fading a yield move only works when the move is a liquidity accident; here it is the market catching up with a state the classification has already identified.

The qualification is that the current-state read is less emphatic than the transition read, with a meaningful residual weight on stagflation. That gap matters, because a confident view on where we will be next period built on a less confident view of where we are now is a fragile thing to lever. I would therefore hold the front-end carry position only where it is paid for and keep equity exposure modest, since a stagflationary drift would hurt both legs at once. The discipline is to take the regime trade in the place where it is compensated and to refuse it everywhere else.

## Monetary policy

The US adds to the case for staying short duration, though through a different channel than the European and UK front ends, where market yields did the repricing. Waller placed a rate increase on the table, saying that if inflation comes in hot, "I would consider a rate hike"<sup>1</sup>, and that "it may not take much acceleration in inflation to nudge me into supporting tighter policy"<sup>1</sup>. He judged that "policy is currently only slightly restricting aggregate demand"<sup>1</sup>, and described inflation as "elevated significantly above the FOMC's 2 percent goal"<sup>2</sup> for "five and a half years"<sup>2</sup>.

The assessment of the stance is the operative part. A policymaker who believes the current setting is barely restrictive has little room to describe a pause as a plateau, because the burden of proof falls on inflation continuing to behave rather than on the committee finding a reason to move. The reference to the duration of the overshoot compounds this: the longer a target has been missed, the harder it becomes to treat further misses as noise, and the lower the tolerance for an upside surprise.

The pause is conditional, not a path: he stated that "forward guidance isn't appropriate now"<sup>3</sup>. The distribution of outcomes for US policy is skewed toward tightening, and duration should stay short across markets rather than only in Europe. Where guidance is withheld, the market has to price the reaction function rather than the promise, and that widens the upper tail without widening the lower one.

## Rates and curve

US rates confirm the tight-policy read and narrow it to duration rather than the policy rate itself. The federal funds target ceiling held at 3.75%<sup>4</sup> and was unchanged on the week, yet the two-year rose +19bp<sup>5</sup> to 4.56%<sup>6</sup> and the ten-year rose +17bp<sup>7</sup> to 4.95%<sup>8</sup>, both at their fifty-two-week highs. The thirty-year added +13bp<sup>9</sup> to 5.37%<sup>10</sup>. The move is real, not inflationary: ten-year breakevens rose only +1bp<sup>11</sup> to 2.36%<sup>12</sup> while ten-year real yields rose +12bp<sup>13</sup> to 2.55%<sup>14</sup>. Term premium stood at 0.89%<sup>15</sup>, near its fifty-two-week high. The curve flattened -8bp<sup>16</sup> to 0.33%<sup>17</sup>.

The decomposition is what makes the move actionable. A repricing carried by breakevens would be a story about the inflation path and would argue for inflation-linked exposure; a repricing carried by real yields is a story about the required return on capital, and it hits every long-duration asset at once, whether or not its cash flows are nominal. The flattening says the same thing from the other end: the front end moved more than the long end, which is what happens when the market marks up the near-term policy path while leaving the eventual destination alone.

Stay short duration; the front end is the only place where carry currently pays for the risk. With term premium already high and real yields leading, adding long-dated exposure here is a bet on the regime turning before the coupon compensates you, and that is not the bet the classification supports.

## Credit

Credit spreads are not paying you for the duration you take, and that is the reason to stay light rather than add. Investment grade spreads narrowed to 0.80%<sup>18</sup>, a move of -1bp<sup>19</sup> on the week and unch.<sup>20</sup> over four weeks, against a fifty-two week range of 0.73%<sup>21</sup> to 0.94%<sup>22</sup>. High yield narrowed to 2.65%<sup>23</sup>, -3bp<sup>24</sup> on the week and close to the fifty-two week low of 2.60%<sup>25</sup>.

Spread compression did not translate into return. The investment grade total return index fell -0.9%<sup>26</sup> to 3,543.08<sup>27</sup>, its fifty-two week low, and high yield fell -0.5%<sup>28</sup> to 1,903.34<sup>29</sup>. Rising sovereign yields, not credit risk, drove the loss, so tight spreads are a reason to own less credit rather than more.

The week is a clean demonstration of what a corporate bond actually is: a government bond with a small option sold against it. When the spread component is compressed toward the bottom of its own range, almost all the price behaviour comes from the sovereign leg, and the investor is taking duration risk while being paid for credit risk. The investment grade index losing more than high yield despite its better credit quality is exactly the signature of that asymmetry, since the shorter-spread, longer-duration asset is the more rate-sensitive one. I would hold credit at the lower end of the range and take the sovereign exposure directly at the front end, where it is priced honestly.

## Equities

Keep equity risk modest, but read the drift as de-rating rather than stress. The broad US large-cap index fell to 7,656.98<sup>30</sup>, down -0.8%<sup>31</sup> on the week and -128.78<sup>32</sup> over four weeks, while the Nasdaq Composite closed at 26,333.04<sup>33</sup>, off -0.7%<sup>34</sup>. Both sit near their one-year highs of 7,798.99<sup>35</sup> and 27,093.90<sup>36</sup>, far above their lows. Tight credit spreads alongside softer equities point to higher discount rates, not deteriorating cash flows, which argues for trimming index beta rather than cutting risk broadly.

The distinction is the whole of the positioning advice. A drawdown driven by earnings expectations spreads through credit first and shows up as widening; a drawdown driven by the discount rate leaves credit alone and takes the longest-duration equity claims hardest. Indices sitting close to their highs while giving ground steadily are consistent with the second and not the first. Trimming beta rather than de-risking wholesale is therefore the proportionate response, and it keeps the portfolio in the asset that is least damaged if the overheating persists without an accident.

## FX and commodities

Energy costs reinforce the tight-policy case. Brent rose to 109.51<sup>37</sup> dollars a barrel, up +7.27<sup>38</sup> on the week and +17.49<sup>39</sup> over four weeks; WTI reached 97.26<sup>40</sup>, up +4.57<sup>41</sup> on the week. The dollar gives no offset: the broad index at 118.07<sup>42</sup> is down -0.83<sup>43</sup> over four weeks, and the major-currency index at 111.74<sup>44</sup> is down -0.50<sup>45</sup>. A weaker dollar and dearer crude keep imported inflation pressure on European and Canadian central banks.

Crude priced in dollars while the dollar itself softens is the combination that transmits an energy move into non-dollar economies at full strength, because the currency leg amplifies rather than cushions it. For committees outside the United States that removes the usual argument for looking through an energy shock, since the local-currency cost is rising on both counts. This is the mechanism that connects the commodity leg to the front-end repricing in the United Kingdom, the euro area and Canada, and it is why I treat those moves as related rather than coincidental.

## Macro data

The US data confirm an economy running hot, which supports staying short duration. Growth tracking sits at 4.42%<sup>46</sup>, the top of its twelve-month range, against a low of 1.24%<sup>47</sup>. Payrolls at 159,075<sup>48</sup> thousand and unemployment at 4.10%<sup>49</sup> are both at the strong end of the past year. Core PCE at 130.66<sup>50</sup> and headline CPI at 334.13<sup>51</sup> are each at twelve-month highs. Consumer sentiment at 55.20<sup>52</sup> is the one soft reading, below its high of 56.60<sup>53</sup>. That single weak series does not change the positioning.

The activity, labour and price legs all point the same way, and that internal agreement is what gives the regime read its confidence. Sentiment surveys have a poor record of leading spending when employment is firm, so I give the soft print little weight against the hard data. This is also the evidence that makes the policy commentary credible rather than rhetorical: a barely restrictive stance described against an economy growing at the top of its range is a stance with an upward bias built in.

## United Kingdom

Gilts argue for staying short duration. Five-year yields rose to 4.89%<sup>54</sup>, up +29bp<sup>55</sup> on the week and +37bp<sup>56</sup> over four weeks, a fifty-two-week high. The ten-year reached 5.32%<sup>57</sup>, up +25bp<sup>58</sup>, and the twenty-year 5.72%<sup>59</sup>. Bank Rate was unchanged at 3.75%<sup>60</sup> and overnight rates held near 3.73%<sup>61</sup>, so the repricing is term premium and inflation risk, not policy action. The front end pays enough to own; the long end does not.

With the policy rate and overnight rates both still, the entire move has come from what the market demands to hold term, and that demand can rise further without the Bank doing anything at all. That is the risk in long gilts: there is no anchor to fade against, and the buyer is short an inflation risk premium that has been expanding. The five-year moving more than the ten-year over the month tells me the market is repricing the near-term policy path, which is the part of the curve where the carry is real.

## Euro area

Stay short euro duration. The repricing is in market yields, not in the policy rate: the two-year rose to 3.13%<sup>62</sup>, up 25bp<sup>63</sup> on the week and 40bp<sup>64</sup> over four weeks, and the ten-year reached 3.52%<sup>65</sup>, a fifty-two week high. The deposit-facility path itself was unchanged at 2.25%<sup>66</sup>. The front end is pricing tightness the Governing Council has not yet delivered, and credit is not corroborating it. Euro high yield spreads sit at 2.68%<sup>67</sup>, below the fifty-two week high of 3.37%<sup>68</sup>.

That divergence is the position: rates are discounting a tightening the Council has not begun while credit is priced for nothing to go wrong, and one of the two is mispriced. I take the rates market as the better-informed leg, because the energy and currency channels give the Council a reason to move that credit spreads are not yet reflecting. The asymmetry favours owning the short end and declining euro high yield at these levels.

## Japan

Japan belongs in the same tightening regime, and the equity leg argues for keeping risk modest. The ten-year rose to 2.99%<sup>69</sup>, up 8bp<sup>70</sup> on the week and 11bp<sup>71</sup> over four weeks, with the two-year at 1.84%<sup>72</sup> after +19bp<sup>73</sup> in four weeks. The Nikkei fell 1.6%<sup>74</sup> to 64,011.34<sup>75</sup>. The yen strengthened to 156.11<sup>76</sup>.

A firmer currency alongside a higher front end is the signature of a policy path being marked up rather than of capital leaving, and it removes the currency tailwind that has supported Japanese equity earnings. That is enough to keep the equity allocation modest without treating the market as impaired.

## Canada

Canada backs the tight-policy case at the front end even without a central bank move. The two-year rose to 3.35%<sup>77</sup>, up +27bp<sup>78</sup> on the week and +39bp<sup>79</sup> over four weeks, a fifty-two-week high. The ten-year rose to 3.95%<sup>80</sup>, up +18bp<sup>81</sup>. The policy rate was unchanged at 2.25%<sup>82</sup>. Repricing this fast at the front end argues for keeping duration short here. An oil-exporting economy with a soft currency faces the energy move as a demand impulse as well as a cost, which makes the front-end move harder to reverse than in the euro area.

## Emerging markets

EM credit is not the place to add risk, despite the spread move. EM corporate spreads tightened to 1.32%<sup>83</sup>, within a basis point of the 1.31%<sup>84</sup> fifty-two week low, and high yield fell 8bp<sup>85</sup> to its own floor at 2.76%<sup>86</sup>. EM equity volatility rose 8.6%<sup>87</sup> on the week to 25.26<sup>88</sup>. Spreads this tight pay too little to offset that equity risk.

Spreads at the bottom of their range and equity volatility rising is an internal contradiction, and it usually resolves against the spread. The compensation for being wrong has been compressed to the point where the position has almost no room to work in the investor's favour and a great deal in the other direction.

## Fiscal and trade policy

Nothing in this week's executive output changes the duration call; the fiscal and trade calendar was empty of measures that would alter supply or the inflation path. The week's proclamation was commemorative. The one substantive order addressed veterans' records, targeting systems the administration called "outdated and unwieldy records management and data systems"<sup>89</sup>, and it is to be implemented "subject to the availability of appropriations"<sup>90</sup>. With no new fiscal impulse on the table, the case for staying short duration rests entirely on the rates evidence. An administrative measure conditioned on appropriations carries no issuance consequence and no inflation consequence, so the term premium move has to be explained by the rates and commodity legs alone.

## What changed

The credit leg of the reading has changed. Last week's note held that "Corporate spreads widened slightly and index total return fell"<sup>91</sup>; this week investment grade spreads narrowed to 0.80%<sup>18</sup> and high yield to 2.65%<sup>23</sup>, so spread widening is no longer part of the case for keeping credit light.

The conclusion survives the change in its reason, which is worth stating plainly rather than quietly. Credit was light last week because spreads were widening; it is light this week because spreads are too tight to pay for the duration embedded in the asset. A recommendation that persists through a reversal in its evidence should be re-examined, and on re-examination this one holds.

The duration call stands. Two-year yields rose +19bp<sup>5</sup> in the United States and +25bp<sup>63</sup> in the euro area, with the ten-year gilt up +25bp<sup>58</sup>. Only a sustained fall in front-end yields would retire it.

Three separate front ends moving together in the same direction is a regime signal rather than a local one, and it is the strongest piece of evidence in the week. I would treat a single week of lower front-end yields as noise and would need the move sustained before shifting duration back toward neutral.

## Citations

1. Waller, The Economic Outlook and Some Comments on My Policy Communication ¶20 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20260903a.htm (2026-09-03)
2. Waller, The Economic Outlook and Some Comments on My Policy Communication ¶12 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20260903a.htm (2026-09-03)
3. Waller, The Economic Outlook and Some Comments on My Policy Communication ¶25 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20260903a.htm (2026-09-03)
4. DFEDTARU.latest = DFEDTARU[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU (2026-09-11)
5. DGS2.chg_1w = DGS2[2026-09-10] - DGS2[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS2 (2026-09-11)
6. DGS2.latest = DGS2[2026-09-10] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS2 (2026-09-11)
7. DGS10.chg_1w = DGS10[2026-09-10] - DGS10[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS10 (2026-09-11)
8. DGS10.latest = DGS10[2026-09-10] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS10 (2026-09-11)
9. DGS30.chg_1w = DGS30[2026-09-10] - DGS30[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS30 (2026-09-11)
10. DGS30.latest = DGS30[2026-09-10] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS30 (2026-09-11)
11. T10YIE.chg_1w = T10YIE[2026-09-11] - T10YIE[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIE (2026-09-11)
12. T10YIE.latest = T10YIE[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIE (2026-09-11)
13. DFII10.chg_1w = DFII10[2026-09-10] - DFII10[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFII10 (2026-09-11)
14. DFII10.latest = DFII10[2026-09-10] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFII10 (2026-09-11)
15. THREEFYTP10.latest = THREEFYTP10[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/THREEFYTP10 (2026-09-08)
16. T10Y2Y.chg_1w = T10Y2Y[2026-09-11] - T10Y2Y[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y (2026-09-11)
17. T10Y2Y.latest = T10Y2Y[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y (2026-09-11)
18. BAMLC0A0CM.latest = BAMLC0A0CM[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-11)
19. BAMLC0A0CM.chg_1w = BAMLC0A0CM[2026-09-11] - BAMLC0A0CM[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-11)
20. BAMLC0A0CM.chg_4w = BAMLC0A0CM[2026-09-11] - BAMLC0A0CM[2026-08-14] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-11)
21. BAMLC0A0CM.lo_52w = min(BAMLC0A0CM[2025-09-15..2026-09-11]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-11)
22. BAMLC0A0CM.hi_52w = max(BAMLC0A0CM[2025-09-15..2026-09-11]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-11)
23. BAMLH0A0HYM2.latest = BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-09-11)
24. BAMLH0A0HYM2.chg_1w = BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-09-11] - BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-09-11)
25. BAMLH0A0HYM2.lo_52w = min(BAMLH0A0HYM2[2025-09-15..2026-09-11]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-09-11)
26. BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV.pct_1w = (BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-09-11] - BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-09-04]) / BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-09-04] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV (2026-09-11)
27. BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV.latest = BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV (2026-09-11)
28. BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV.pct_1w = (BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-09-11] - BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-09-04]) / BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-09-04] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV (2026-09-11)
29. BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV.latest = BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV (2026-09-11)
30. S&P 500 index level — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-14)
31. SP500.pct_1w = (SP500[2026-09-11] - SP500[2026-09-04]) / SP500[2026-09-04] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-14)
32. SP500.chg_4w = SP500[2026-09-11] - SP500[2026-08-14] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-14)
33. NASDAQCOM.latest = NASDAQCOM[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-11)
34. NASDAQCOM.pct_1w = (NASDAQCOM[2026-09-11] - NASDAQCOM[2026-09-04]) / NASDAQCOM[2026-09-04] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-11)
35. SP500.hi_52w = max(SP500[2025-09-15..2026-09-11]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-14)
36. NASDAQCOM.hi_52w = max(NASDAQCOM[2025-09-15..2026-09-11]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-11)
37. DCOILBRENTEU.latest = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-09] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-10)
38. DCOILBRENTEU.chg_1w = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-09] - DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-10)
39. DCOILBRENTEU.chg_4w = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-09] - DCOILBRENTEU[2026-08-14] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-10)
40. DCOILWTICO.latest = DCOILWTICO[2026-09-09] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILWTICO (2026-09-10)
41. DCOILWTICO.chg_1w = DCOILWTICO[2026-09-09] - DCOILWTICO[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILWTICO (2026-09-10)
42. DTWEXBGS.latest = DTWEXBGS[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXBGS (2026-09-08)
43. DTWEXBGS.chg_4w = DTWEXBGS[2026-09-04] - DTWEXBGS[2026-08-14] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXBGS (2026-09-08)
44. DTWEXAFEGS.latest = DTWEXAFEGS[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXAFEGS (2026-09-08)
45. DTWEXAFEGS.chg_4w = DTWEXAFEGS[2026-09-04] - DTWEXAFEGS[2026-08-14] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXAFEGS (2026-09-08)
46. GDPNOW.latest = GDPNOW[2026-07-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPNOW (2026-09-10)
47. GDPNOW.lo_52w = min(GDPNOW[2025-10-01..2026-07-01]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPNOW (2026-09-10)
48. PAYEMS.latest = PAYEMS[2026-08-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS (2026-09-04)
49. UNRATE.latest = UNRATE[2026-08-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE (2026-09-04)
50. PCEPILFE.latest = PCEPILFE[2026-07-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPILFE (2026-08-26)
51. CPIAUCSL.latest = CPIAUCSL[2026-08-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL (2026-09-11)
52. UMCSENT.latest = UMCSENT[2026-07-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UMCSENT (2026-07-31)
53. UMCSENT.hi_52w = max(UMCSENT[2025-10-01..2026-07-01]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UMCSENT (2026-07-31)
54. GB5Y.latest = GB5Y[2026-09-10] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-14)
55. GB5Y.chg_1w = GB5Y[2026-09-10] - GB5Y[2026-09-04] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-14)
56. GB5Y.chg_4w = GB5Y[2026-09-10] - GB5Y[2026-08-14] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-14)
57. GB10Y.latest = GB10Y[2026-09-10] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-14)
58. GB10Y.chg_1w = GB10Y[2026-09-10] - GB10Y[2026-09-04] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-14)
59. GB20Y.latest = GB20Y[2026-09-10] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-14)
60. GBPOL.latest = GBPOL[2026-09-11] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-14)
61. IUDSOIA.latest = IUDSOIA[2026-09-09] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IUDSOIA (2026-09-11)
62. EA2Y.latest = EA2Y[2026-09-11] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-14)
63. EA2Y.chg_1w = EA2Y[2026-09-11] - EA2Y[2026-09-04] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-14)
64. EA2Y.chg_4w = EA2Y[2026-09-11] - EA2Y[2026-08-14] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-14)
65. EA10Y.latest = EA10Y[2026-09-11] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-14)
66. EAPOL.latest = EAPOL[2026-09-11] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-14)
67. BAMLHE00EHYIOAS.latest = BAMLHE00EHYIOAS[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHE00EHYIOAS (2026-09-11)
68. BAMLHE00EHYIOAS.hi_52w = max(BAMLHE00EHYIOAS[2025-09-15..2026-09-11]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHE00EHYIOAS (2026-09-11)
69. JP10Y.latest = JP10Y[2026-09-11] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-14)
70. JP10Y.chg_1w = JP10Y[2026-09-11] - JP10Y[2026-09-04] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-14)
71. JP10Y.chg_4w = JP10Y[2026-09-11] - JP10Y[2026-08-14] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-14)
72. JP2Y.latest = JP2Y[2026-09-11] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-14)
73. JP2Y.chg_4w = JP2Y[2026-09-11] - JP2Y[2026-08-14] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-14)
74. NIKKEI225.pct_1w = (NIKKEI225[2026-09-11] - NIKKEI225[2026-09-04]) / NIKKEI225[2026-09-04] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NIKKEI225 (2026-09-11)
75. NIKKEI225.latest = NIKKEI225[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NIKKEI225 (2026-09-11)
76. DEXJPUS.latest = DEXJPUS[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXJPUS (2026-09-08)
77. CA2Y.latest = CA2Y[2026-09-11] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-14)
78. CA2Y.chg_1w = CA2Y[2026-09-11] - CA2Y[2026-09-04] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-14)
79. CA2Y.chg_4w = CA2Y[2026-09-11] - CA2Y[2026-08-14] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-14)
80. CA10Y.latest = CA10Y[2026-09-11] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-14)
81. CA10Y.chg_1w = CA10Y[2026-09-11] - CA10Y[2026-09-04] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-14)
82. CAPOL.latest = CAPOL[2026-09-11] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-14)
83. BAMLEMCBPIOAS.latest = BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMCBPIOAS (2026-09-11)
84. BAMLEMCBPIOAS.lo_52w = min(BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2025-09-15..2026-09-11]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMCBPIOAS (2026-09-11)
85. BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS.chg_1w = BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-09-11] - BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS (2026-09-11)
86. BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS.lo_52w = min(BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2025-09-15..2026-09-11]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS (2026-09-11)
87. VXEEMCLS.pct_1w = (VXEEMCLS[2026-09-11] - VXEEMCLS[2026-09-04]) / VXEEMCLS[2026-09-04] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/VXEEMCLS (2026-09-11)
88. VXEEMCLS.latest = VXEEMCLS[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/VXEEMCLS (2026-09-11)
89. Accelerating Access To Veterans’ Benefits And Employment Opportunities ¶1 — https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/09/accelerating-access-to-veterans-benefits-and-employment-opportunities/ (2026-09-08)
90. Accelerating Access To Veterans’ Benefits And Employment Opportunities ¶15 — https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/09/accelerating-access-to-veterans-benefits-and-employment-opportunities/ (2026-09-08)
91. institutional_weekly run 9 (2026-09-04)