# Briefing — Q3 2026
*The quarter was a global repricing of real rates, not of inflation risk. Long US real yields, euro area and Japanese government yields all rose sharply together, while price pressure sits well below its long-run norm and activity sits near its average. The regime is benign growth with soft inflation, and the move in yields reflects term premium rather than a revived inflation problem.*
## Equities
Equities ended the quarter higher, but the gain was made before September, and that timing matters more than the headline. The broad US benchmark rose 2.0%1 over the quarter, to 7,651.542, and was up 11.8%3 on the year to date. The Nasdaq Composite rose 2.5%4 on the quarter and 15.6%5 year to date, closing at 26,861.066. Both remain below their twelve-month highs of 7,798.997 and 27,244.288. The quarter therefore continued the year's advance rather than extending it at pace: the bulk of the annual return was already banked when the quarter opened, and the three months added a modest increment on top of it while leaving both indices short of ground they had already touched within the past year.
The final weeks tell a different story from the quarter as a whole. The broad US benchmark fell 0.5%9 over September and fell 0.7%10 in the closing week, while the Nasdaq gained 1.9%11 on the month and fell 0.3%12 in that same week. So the broad index gave back ground exactly when the rise in long real yields was most pronounced, and when credit spreads did most of their widening. That coincidence is the substance of the section. A discount rate that rises lowers the present value of distant cash flows mechanically, whatever the earnings path, and the index composition decides who feels it first. The divergence between a flat broad index and a firmer technology-weighted index narrows the claim that equity pricing was untroubled: discount-rate pressure showed up at the index level late, and it showed up alongside credit, not in isolation. An equity market absorbing a real-rate shock without a growth shock looks exactly like this — the aggregate stalls, the leadership does not break, and the losses are shallow and concentrated at the end of the period.
If long real yields stabilise, the quarter's pattern suggests equity drawdowns stay shallow and the year-to-date gain holds. If real yields keep rising while credit spreads widen further, the September weakness in the broad index is likely to extend rather than reverse. The observable that settles this is whether spread widening continues once yields steady. A stall in the broad index while the technology-weighted index continues to gain would mean the pressure is still arithmetic rather than a judgement on earnings.
## Monetary policy
US policy tightened in the quarter rather than eased, which separates this episode from the easing cycles the committee may have been positioned for. The Committee raised its policy rate at the September meeting, deciding to "raise the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/4 percentage point to 3-3/4 to 4 percent"13, a step taken by unanimous vote, "by a 12 – 0 vote"14. The unanimity matters as much as the increment: a divided vote would have signalled a live internal debate about the sufficiency of the stance, and there was none. That continued the direction of travel in short rates at a point when measured price pressure had already fallen well below its long-run norm, so the quarter's policy move ran ahead of, rather than behind, the inflation data.
The stated rationale was the level of inflation and the time it has spent above target, not a fresh acceleration. The statement said "Inflation remains elevated"15 and that "Today's policy action will support a timelier return to the Committee's 2 percent goal"15. Governor Cook framed the same point cumulatively, noting that "it has exceeded the Fed's 2 percent target for more than five years"16, and committing to "returning inflation to our objective while preserving the strength in the labor market"16. The activity side described was solid rather than strained: "Economic activity is expanding at a solid pace"17, while "Job gains have kept pace with the workforce, and the unemployment rate has changed little"17 and "the labor market is largely stable"18. A policy tightening justified by an accumulated overshoot, delivered into stable employment and soft current inflation, raises the real policy rate directly; that is the channel through which the quarter's long-yield move was a real-rate event. The logic is cumulative rather than cyclical, and a cumulative argument does not switch off when a single quarter of prices comes in soft.
If realised inflation stays below its long-run norm while activity holds near average, the policy rate reached this quarter is likely to be the peak and the reconciliation falls to the inflation data rather than to the rhetoric. If instead the decline in price pressure stalls, the stated commitment points to further increases and to a higher real rate still. The observable that settles it is the path of measured inflation over the next two quarters. A stance framed around an accumulated overshoot is slower to reverse than one framed around a forecast, so the lag between soft prices and an easing bias is likely to be longer than usual.
## Rates and curve
The Treasury curve sold off hard across every maturity in the third quarter, and the move was concentrated in real yields. The ten-year note ended the quarter at 5.29%19, up 85bp20 on the quarter and 111bp21 on the year, closing at its highest level of the past year at 5.29%22. The thirty-year rose 73bp23 over the quarter to 5.64%24, also a fifty-two week high, while the two-year rose 74bp25 to 4.88%26. The curve steepened modestly, with the ten-year minus two-year spread up 11bp27 to 0.41%28, which only partly reverses a year-to-date narrowing of 30bp29. A move of broadly similar size at the front, the belly and the long end is not a reassessment of the policy path; it is a shift in the level of yields at which the whole curve clears.
The composition of the move is the point. Ten-year real yields rose 73bp30 over the quarter to 2.93%31, the highest level in the past year, and are up 100bp32 year to date. Ten-year breakeven inflation rose only 12bp33 over the quarter to 2.36%34, and 11bp35 on the year, leaving it below its fifty-two week high of 2.50%36. Nearly the whole of the nominal rise was therefore real: the market demanded more compensation for holding duration, not more compensation for expected prices. Policy accounts for part of the front end: the upper bound of the federal funds target was raised 25bp37 over the quarter to 4.00%38, the only change in the target this year. Policy therefore explains a fraction of the front-end move and almost none of the long-end move, which leaves term premium carrying the remainder. This is the hinge for the rest of the piece: a real-rate repricing hits long duration assets hardest and leaves credit quality and earnings expectations largely alone, which is precisely the pattern the equity and credit sections describe.
If breakevens stay near their current range while long real yields continue to climb, the repricing is a term premium story and not an inflation story. A sustained rise in breakevens above their past-year high would be the observation that overturns that reading. With the policy rate still below its past-year peak, further tightening would push the front end rather than the long end. A renewed flattening would then indicate the market reading additional tightening as effective rather than insufficient.
## Credit
Credit spreads widened in the third quarter, but the move was small, late and concentrated in September. Investment grade spreads ended at 0.84%39, up 0.0840 percentage points on the quarter and 0.0541 percentage points on the year, still below their fifty-two week high of 0.94%42. High yield widened 0.3743 percentage points on the quarter to 3.12%44, of which 0.4945 percentage points came in September alone, reversing the narrowing that had taken the series to a fifty-two week low of 2.60%46. The arithmetic there is informative: the monthly widening exceeded the quarterly widening, so the first two months of the quarter were still compressing. The quarter interrupted the compression of the first half rather than breaking the range.
The damage was in price, not in credit quality. The investment grade total return index fell 3.8%47 over the quarter and 2.8%48 on the year, closing at its fifty-two week low of 3,487.2749, a loss driven by duration rather than default risk. High yield, with less duration, lost 1.8%50 on the quarter and was flat on the year. That split is what a repricing of real rates looks like: the longest cash flows were marked down hardest, and the riskiest were not, which is why equity pricing held while credit index levels fell. An investor reading total returns alone would conclude that credit conditions deteriorated materially; an investor reading spreads alone would conclude almost nothing happened. Both are describing the same underlying event, which is a higher discount rate applied to a market whose average maturity is long. The compensation for bearing default risk barely changed; the compensation for bearing time changed a great deal.
If the September widening in high yield extends into the fourth quarter while investment grade spreads stay inside their range, the move is still a rates story. High yield spreads taking out their fifty-two week high would point instead to deteriorating credit fundamentals. A high yield market that merely gives back its September move once yields settle would confirm that the widening was a function of duration repricing passing through the riskier part of the market last.
## Real assets and currencies
Crude was the quarter's largest move in this section, and it is the single input most capable of overturning the benign inflation reading elsewhere in this piece. Brent ended at $113.9651 a barrel, up $43.5052 over the quarter and $52.6153 over the year to date, leaving it near the twelve-month high of $138.2154 and far above the low of $59.9355. West Texas Intermediate followed, closing at $96.1656 after a gain of $25.6057 on the quarter and $38.9058 on the year. September carried most of it: Brent added $24.2159 in the month, so the quarter's rise accelerated rather than faded. A move that accelerates into the close of a period carries more forward information than one that fades, because the price level the next quarter inherits is the high one.
The dollar did not corroborate the energy move. The broad index was -0.5%60 on the quarter and the advanced-economy index -0.3%61, both still positive on the year at +0.5%62 and +2.4%63 respectively, with a September recovery of 1.5%64 and 1.6%65 reversing part of the earlier slippage. A dollar that softened while crude doubled its quarterly pace points to oil supply rather than global demand or a shift in the relative stance of policy. A demand-led energy rally would normally arrive with a firmer dollar and firmer cyclical assets; neither happened in the first two months. The currency therefore argues for reading the oil move as a constraint on supply rather than as evidence of strength in the world economy, which matters because the two carry opposite implications for growth.
An energy move of this size is the clearest route by which measured inflation could stop falling, which is the condition that would turn the current reading of price pressure into a live constraint again. If crude holds near the quarter's close and the dollar stays within its recent range, headline inflation is likely to firm from here even as the underlying regime stays one of steady activity. If crude instead retraces toward the lower end of its twelve-month range, the soft inflation reading persists and the rise in long yields stands as a term premium story alone.
## Macro data
US activity firmed through the quarter without any matching pickup in price pressure, and that combination is what the policy section has to be read against. The Atlanta Fed nowcast stood at 3.68%66 for the third quarter, up 2.1467 percentage points from the second, and it sits at the top of its own range of the past year at 3.68%68 against a low of 1.24%69. That reverses the slowdown of the second quarter, though the nowcast was still -0.5670 percentage points against the fourth quarter of last year, which places the quarter near its average rather than above it. The year so far therefore reads as a dip followed by a recovery back to trend, not as an acceleration beyond it.
The labour market carried the growth without tightening. Payrolls added 15271 thousand jobs over the quarter and 61272 thousand over the year to date, reaching 159,04473 thousand, the high of the past year. Unemployment did not move over the quarter, ending at 4.20%74 after a rise of 0.1075 percentage points in the final month, and was down 0.2076 percentage points on the year. Employment growing while the unemployment rate holds is the signature of supply keeping pace with demand, and it removes the labour market as a source of fresh price pressure. Inflation did not accelerate with activity: consumer prices rose 3.4%77 on the year and 0.4%78 on the month, while core PCE prices rose 3.0%79 on the year and 0.2%80 on the month. The gap between the headline and core monthly prints is consistent with the energy move described above passing into the headline first. Consumer sentiment recovered 4.4%81 over the quarter to 51.7082 but was still down 2.3%83 on the year.
If core PCE continues to run at or below its current yearly pace while payroll gains hold, the rise in long yields is better read as a term premium adjustment than as a repricing of inflation. A renewed fall in unemployment alongside faster monthly core prints would point the other way.
## United Kingdom
Gilt yields rose across the curve in the third quarter, extending rather than interrupting the rise already run this year. The ten-year gilt ended at 5.37%84, up 0.6385 percentage points on the quarter and 0.9086 points on the year, within reach of its twelve-month high of 5.38%87. The five-year rose 0.6488 points and the twenty-year 0.4889 points, so the move was led by the front and belly rather than the very long end. That shape is unusual in a market repricing term premium alone, and it narrows the range of explanations: either the front end is pricing a policy path the Committee has not endorsed, or the belly is absorbing supply and duration pressure imported from the larger markets.
The policy rate did not move: Bank Rate was unchanged on the quarter at 3.75%90 and overnight SONIA was unchanged at 3.73%91. The Committee voted to "maintain Bank Rate at 3.75%"92, noting that "there have continued to be clear signs of underlying disinflation in recent data"93. Sterling was little changed over the quarter at 1.325094 dollars, though it fell 0.030095 in September. With the stance on hold and inflation pressure easing, the yield move was priced term premium rather than policy expectations. A currency that held through a sizeable yield rise reinforces that reading: a market demanding more compensation for holding domestic duration on fiscal or supply grounds would usually show strain in the exchange rate, and the quarter did not deliver one until its final weeks.
If underlying disinflation continues and energy prices subside, the next move in Bank Rate is more likely to be down than up. Evidence of second-round effects in pay settlements would point the other way and keep front-end yields rising. A further fall in sterling alongside continued front-end increases would be the signal that the market has stopped treating the stance as credible.
## Euro area
Euro area yields rose sharply across the curve in the third quarter, and the timing concentrates the whole of the year's adjustment into a single period. The ten-year ended at 3.58%96, up 66bp97 on the quarter and 63bp98 on the year, which means the whole of the year's increase came in these three months after a flat first half. The two-year rose 68bp99 over the quarter to 3.16%100, so the move was parallel rather than a repricing of near-term policy alone. A parallel shift of that size in one quarter, after two quarters of nothing, is better explained by a common global factor than by a domestic reassessment, and the US section identifies that factor as the real yield. Activity was steady, with real GDP up 1.2%101 on the year and 0.6%102 on the quarter, and consumer prices rose 3.2%103 on the year.
Credit and the currency confirm that this was a rates event rather than a growth scare. High yield spreads widened 30bp104 over the quarter to 3.00%105, and the euro was -0.0017106 dollars on the quarter. A growth scare large enough to move the whole curve would have shown far more in the riskiest part of the credit market and in the currency; neither moved much. The ECB's supervisory agenda stayed with resilience, stating that "The timely and full implementation of Basel III therefore remains critical"107, which is the language of an authority managing structural capital standards rather than responding to stress.
If euro area growth holds near its recent pace, the rise in long yields is likely to persist as a term premium adjustment rather than reverse. A fall in the annual inflation rate alongside further long-end increases would confirm that reading; a renewed acceleration in prices would overturn it.
## Japan
Japanese yields rose across the curve in the third quarter, with the front end leading, which distinguishes the move from the term premium repricing seen elsewhere. The two-year rose 57bp108 to 1.95%109, the ten-year rose 37bp110 to 3.06%111, and the thirty-year rose 22bp112 to 4.10%113. The gradient from front to long is the opposite of a pure duration event: here the market repriced the policy path first and let the long end follow at a reduced pace. That continued a year-long repricing: the ten-year is up 99bp114 on the year, close to its high of 3.08%115.
The Bank of Japan raised the policy rate in September, noting that "underlying CPI inflation has been approaching 2 percent"116 and that "Japan's financial conditions have been accommodative"116. Both clauses point the same way: a central bank describing its own conditions as accommodative while inflation converges on target is describing a stance it intends to narrow further. The yen firmed 5.43117 yen against the dollar over the quarter, which is the expected response to a front-led repricing and removes imported price pressure as a near-term concern. The Nikkei fell 4.7%118, interrupting a year still up 32.6%119, so the equity market absorbed the policy move without surrendering the bulk of its annual gain. Unemployment was 2.40%120 in July.
Further front-end repricing depends on whether underlying inflation settles at the target rather than above it. A renewed fall in the yen would make the case for faster policy adjustment.
## Canada
Canadian yields rose across the curve in the third quarter, with the ten-year at 3.99%121 after a gain of 61bp122 on the quarter, which took it to its highest level of the past year and accounted for more than the whole of the 57bp123 rise since the year began. That arithmetic means the market had been pricing lower yields before the quarter opened and reversed the lot in three months. The two-year added 63bp124, extending a run that reaches 79bp125 year to date. The policy rate did not move at any point in the quarter, so none of this came from a delivered change in the stance.
The move was not a policy move and not an activity move. Real output grew 0.8%126 on the quarter and 1.1%127 on the year, and unemployment eased to 6.40%128, down 0.40129 percentage points since December. Growth at that pace with a falling unemployment rate is steady rather than strong, and it does not by itself justify a curve-wide repricing of this size. The Bank attributed the price impulse to an external source, noting that "elevated oil and fuel prices have pushed inflation above the 2% target"130. That connects the Canadian curve directly to the energy section: the inflation overshoot being described is imported from a price the central bank does not set, and an imported overshoot is the kind a policymaker is most willing to look through if the price source reverses.
If oil prices retrace, the inflation component of Canadian yields should fade and leave the term premium explanation standing. A further rise in the long end alongside an unchanged policy rate would confirm that the repricing is of real rates rather than of expected policy.
## Emerging markets
Emerging market credit ended the quarter wider, but only just, and the widening came almost entirely in the final month. Investment grade EM corporate spreads closed at 1.51%131, a move of +0.05132 percentage points over the quarter against +0.14133 percentage points in September alone, and they remain -0.05134 percentage points on the year. High yield EM spreads tell the same story, at 3.19%135 after a quarterly change of +0.08136 percentage points and a monthly one of +0.29137 percentage points. In both tiers the monthly move exceeds the quarterly one, which means the first two months compressed and the final month gave it back with a little more, exactly as in the US credit market.
The currency side argues against a growth or inflation shock. The EM dollar index fell 0.7%138 over the quarter, the won strengthened 192.27139 won per dollar, and EM equity volatility fell 26.3%140 on the quarter even after rising 11.2%141 in September. A genuine funding or growth shock in this asset class shows first in currencies and in volatility, and both moved the benign way across the quarter as a whole. The late-quarter widening coincided with the repricing of global duration rather than with weaker EM currencies, which places the cause outside the region.
If EM spreads retrace the September widening while currencies hold, the move was a term premium effect rather than a credit one. A further widening accompanied by a stronger dollar index would instead point to deteriorating EM fundamentals.
## Fiscal and trade policy
Policy action in the quarter carried no fiscal or trade impulse, which removes the two most common alternative explanations for a rise in long yields. The executive instruments issued late in the quarter were administrative and public-health measures rather than taxing, spending or tariff decisions, and so added nothing to the supply of government paper or to the price of traded goods. One directed agencies to pursue "safe and effective tick and mosquito population control"142, with implementation subject to the standard constraint that it "shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations"143. That qualifying language is itself evidence of the absence of a fiscal impulse: an instrument conditioned on existing appropriations commits no new money. A second confined itself to nomenclature, directing the executive branch to use "“Super Intelligence” and “SI” in place of “Artificial Intelligence” and “AI”"144. A further action withdrew pending nominations from the Senate, which bears on personnel rather than on the budget or on trade.
The absence of a fiscal or trade decision in the quarter leaves the rise in long yields to be explained by term premium rather than by policy supply or import costs. That reading holds unless a subsequent borrowing or tariff announcement reaches the pack, which would point the other way.
## Regime
The classification shifted over the quarter from an overheating regime to a Goldilocks one, with growth sitting close to its long-run average and price pressure well below it. That is a reversal rather than a continuation: the prior reading had inflation above norm and the labelling now places the dominant weight on benign growth with soft inflation. The alternative readings, including contraction, carry materially less weight, and the transition probability into the benign state dominates the others. A reversal of this kind is less stable than a continuation, because it rests on a short run of observations rather than on an established trend.
The driver is the inflation gap rather than the growth gap. Growth barely moved from its average, so the whole of the regime change comes from price pressure falling below norm. This sits against a policy stance still set for elevated inflation: the measured gap is backward-looking in the sense that it reflects realised prices, while the policy rate reflects a judgement that disinflation is not yet secure. Both descriptions can hold at once, and the quarter's rise in long yields is consistent with term premium rather than with a revived inflation problem. The tension in the quarter is therefore between a classification driven by realised prices and a stance driven by cumulative history, and the energy move is the mechanism most likely to resolve it in the direction of the stance.
If the inflation gap stays below norm into the next quarter, the case for further policy tightening weakens. If instead realised price pressure stops falling, the regime reading is likely to revert toward the prior overheating state. Growth near its average means the deciding observable is inflation, not activity.
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36. T10YIE.hi_52w = max(T10YIE[2025-10-02..2026-09-30]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIE (2026-09-30)
37. DFEDTARU.chg_qtd = DFEDTARU[2026-09-30] - DFEDTARU[2026-06-30] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU (2026-09-30)
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41. BAMLC0A0CM.chg_ytd = BAMLC0A0CM[2026-09-30] - BAMLC0A0CM[2025-12-31] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-30)
42. BAMLC0A0CM.hi_52w = max(BAMLC0A0CM[2025-10-02..2026-09-30]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-30)
43. BAMLH0A0HYM2.chg_qtd = BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-09-30] - BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-06-30] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-09-30)
44. BAMLH0A0HYM2.latest = BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-09-30] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-09-30)
45. BAMLH0A0HYM2.chg_mtd = BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-09-30] - BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-08-31] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-09-30)
46. BAMLH0A0HYM2.lo_52w = min(BAMLH0A0HYM2[2025-10-02..2026-09-30]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-09-30)
47. BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV.pct_qtd = (BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-09-30] - BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-06-30]) / BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-06-30] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV (2026-09-30)
48. BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV.pct_ytd = (BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-09-30] - BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2025-12-31]) / BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2025-12-31] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV (2026-09-30)
49. BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV.lo_52w = min(BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2025-10-02..2026-09-30]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV (2026-09-30)
50. BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV.pct_qtd = (BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-09-30] - BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-06-30]) / BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-06-30] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV (2026-09-30)
51. DCOILBRENTEU.latest = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-29] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-30)
52. DCOILBRENTEU.chg_qtd = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-29] - DCOILBRENTEU[2026-06-30] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-30)
53. DCOILBRENTEU.chg_ytd = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-29] - DCOILBRENTEU[2025-12-31] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-30)
54. DCOILBRENTEU.hi_52w = max(DCOILBRENTEU[2025-10-02..2026-09-29]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-30)
55. DCOILBRENTEU.lo_52w = min(DCOILBRENTEU[2025-10-02..2026-09-29]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-30)
56. DCOILWTICO.latest = DCOILWTICO[2026-09-29] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILWTICO (2026-09-30)
57. DCOILWTICO.chg_qtd = DCOILWTICO[2026-09-29] - DCOILWTICO[2026-06-30] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILWTICO (2026-09-30)
58. DCOILWTICO.chg_ytd = DCOILWTICO[2026-09-29] - DCOILWTICO[2025-12-31] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILWTICO (2026-09-30)
59. DCOILBRENTEU.chg_mtd = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-29] - DCOILBRENTEU[2026-08-28] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-30)
60. DTWEXBGS.pct_qtd = (DTWEXBGS[2026-09-25] - DTWEXBGS[2026-06-30]) / DTWEXBGS[2026-06-30] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXBGS (2026-09-28)
61. DTWEXAFEGS.pct_qtd = (DTWEXAFEGS[2026-09-25] - DTWEXAFEGS[2026-06-30]) / DTWEXAFEGS[2026-06-30] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXAFEGS (2026-09-28)
62. DTWEXBGS.pct_ytd = (DTWEXBGS[2026-09-25] - DTWEXBGS[2025-12-31]) / DTWEXBGS[2025-12-31] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXBGS (2026-09-28)
63. DTWEXAFEGS.pct_ytd = (DTWEXAFEGS[2026-09-25] - DTWEXAFEGS[2025-12-31]) / DTWEXAFEGS[2025-12-31] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXAFEGS (2026-09-28)
64. DTWEXBGS.pct_mtd = (DTWEXBGS[2026-09-25] - DTWEXBGS[2026-08-31]) / DTWEXBGS[2026-08-31] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXBGS (2026-09-28)
65. DTWEXAFEGS.pct_mtd = (DTWEXAFEGS[2026-09-25] - DTWEXAFEGS[2026-08-31]) / DTWEXAFEGS[2026-08-31] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXAFEGS (2026-09-28)
66. GDPNOW.latest = GDPNOW[2026-07-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPNOW (2026-10-01)
67. GDPNOW.chg_qtd = GDPNOW[2026-07-01] - GDPNOW[2026-04-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPNOW (2026-10-01)
68. GDPNOW.hi_52w = max(GDPNOW[2026-01-01..2026-07-01]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPNOW (2026-10-01)
69. GDPNOW.lo_52w = min(GDPNOW[2026-01-01..2026-07-01]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPNOW (2026-10-01)
70. GDPNOW.chg_ytd = GDPNOW[2026-07-01] - GDPNOW[2025-10-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPNOW (2026-10-01)
71. PAYEMS.chg_qtd = PAYEMS[2026-09-01] - PAYEMS[2026-06-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS (2026-10-02)
72. PAYEMS.chg_ytd = PAYEMS[2026-09-01] - PAYEMS[2025-12-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS (2026-10-02)
73. PAYEMS.latest = PAYEMS[2026-09-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS (2026-10-02)
74. UNRATE.latest = UNRATE[2026-09-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE (2026-10-02)
75. UNRATE.chg_mtd = UNRATE[2026-09-01] - UNRATE[2026-08-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE (2026-10-02)
76. UNRATE.chg_ytd = UNRATE[2026-09-01] - UNRATE[2025-12-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE (2026-10-02)
77. CPIAUCSL.pct_yoy = (CPIAUCSL[2026-08-01] - CPIAUCSL[2025-08-01]) / CPIAUCSL[2025-08-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL (2026-09-11)
78. CPIAUCSL.pct_mom = (CPIAUCSL[2026-08-01] - CPIAUCSL[2026-07-01]) / CPIAUCSL[2026-07-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL (2026-09-11)
79. PCEPILFE.pct_yoy = (PCEPILFE[2026-08-01] - PCEPILFE[2025-08-01]) / PCEPILFE[2025-08-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPILFE (2026-09-30)
80. PCEPILFE.pct_mom = (PCEPILFE[2026-08-01] - PCEPILFE[2026-07-01]) / PCEPILFE[2026-07-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPILFE (2026-09-30)
81. UMCSENT.pct_qtd = (UMCSENT[2026-08-01] - UMCSENT[2026-06-01]) / UMCSENT[2026-06-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UMCSENT (2026-08-28)
82. UMCSENT.latest = UMCSENT[2026-08-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UMCSENT (2026-08-28)
83. UMCSENT.pct_ytd = (UMCSENT[2026-08-01] - UMCSENT[2025-12-01]) / UMCSENT[2025-12-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UMCSENT (2026-08-28)
84. GB10Y.latest = GB10Y[2026-09-30] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-10-02)
85. GB10Y.chg_qtd = GB10Y[2026-09-30] - GB10Y[2026-06-30] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-10-02)
86. GB10Y.chg_ytd = GB10Y[2026-09-30] - GB10Y[2025-12-31] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-10-02)
87. GB10Y.hi_52w = max(GB10Y[2025-10-02..2026-09-30]) — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-10-02)
88. GB5Y.chg_qtd = GB5Y[2026-09-30] - GB5Y[2026-06-30] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-10-02)
89. GB20Y.chg_qtd = GB20Y[2026-09-30] - GB20Y[2026-06-30] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-10-02)
90. GBPOL.latest = GBPOL[2026-09-30] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-10-01)
91. IUDSOIA.latest = IUDSOIA[2026-09-30] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IUDSOIA (2026-10-02)
92. Bank Rate maintained at 3.75% - July 2026 Monetary Policy Summary and Minutes ¶0 — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-summary-and-minutes/2026/july-2026 (2026-07-30)
93. Bank Rate maintained at 3.75% - July 2026 Monetary Policy Summary and Minutes ¶2 — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-summary-and-minutes/2026/july-2026 (2026-07-30)
94. DEXUSUK.latest = DEXUSUK[2026-09-25] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXUSUK (2026-09-28)
95. DEXUSUK.chg_mtd = DEXUSUK[2026-09-25] - DEXUSUK[2026-08-31] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXUSUK (2026-09-28)
96. EA10Y.latest = EA10Y[2026-09-30] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-10-03)
97. EA10Y.chg_qtd = EA10Y[2026-09-30] - EA10Y[2026-06-30] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-10-03)
98. EA10Y.chg_ytd = EA10Y[2026-09-30] - EA10Y[2025-12-31] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-10-03)
99. EA2Y.chg_qtd = EA2Y[2026-09-30] - EA2Y[2026-06-30] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-10-03)
100. EA2Y.latest = EA2Y[2026-09-30] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-10-03)
101. CLVMNACSCAB1GQEA19.pct_yoy = (CLVMNACSCAB1GQEA19[2026-04-01] - CLVMNACSCAB1GQEA19[2025-04-01]) / CLVMNACSCAB1GQEA19[2025-04-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CLVMNACSCAB1GQEA19 (2026-09-07)
102. CLVMNACSCAB1GQEA19.pct_qoq = (CLVMNACSCAB1GQEA19[2026-04-01] - CLVMNACSCAB1GQEA19[2026-01-01]) / CLVMNACSCAB1GQEA19[2026-01-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CLVMNACSCAB1GQEA19 (2026-09-07)
103. CP0000EZ19M086NEST.pct_yoy = (CP0000EZ19M086NEST[2026-08-01] - CP0000EZ19M086NEST[2025-08-01]) / CP0000EZ19M086NEST[2025-08-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CP0000EZ19M086NEST (2026-09-17)
104. BAMLHE00EHYIOAS.chg_qtd = BAMLHE00EHYIOAS[2026-09-30] - BAMLHE00EHYIOAS[2026-06-30] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHE00EHYIOAS (2026-09-30)
105. BAMLHE00EHYIOAS.latest = BAMLHE00EHYIOAS[2026-09-30] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHE00EHYIOAS (2026-09-30)
106. DEXUSEU.chg_qtd = DEXUSEU[2026-09-25] - DEXUSEU[2026-06-30] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXUSEU (2026-09-28)
107. Frank Elderson: Supervisory risk appetite, efficiency and effectiveness ¶28 — https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2026/html/ecb.sp260930~d495288355.en.html (2026-09-30)
108. JP2Y.chg_qtd = JP2Y[2026-09-30] - JP2Y[2026-06-30] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-10-03)
109. JP2Y.latest = JP2Y[2026-09-30] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-10-03)
110. JP10Y.chg_qtd = JP10Y[2026-09-30] - JP10Y[2026-06-30] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-10-03)
111. JP10Y.latest = JP10Y[2026-09-30] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-10-03)
112. JP30Y.chg_qtd = JP30Y[2026-09-30] - JP30Y[2026-06-30] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-10-03)
113. JP30Y.latest = JP30Y[2026-09-30] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-10-03)
114. JP10Y.chg_ytd = JP10Y[2026-09-30] - JP10Y[2025-12-30] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-10-03)
115. JP10Y.hi_52w = max(JP10Y[2025-10-02..2026-09-30]) — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-10-03)
116. Bank of Japan monetary policy decision, 2026-09-18 ¶4 — https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/mpmdeci/mpr_2026/k260918a.pdf (2026-09-18)
117. DEXJPUS.chg_qtd = DEXJPUS[2026-09-25] - DEXJPUS[2026-06-30] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXJPUS (2026-09-28)
118. NIKKEI225.pct_qtd = (NIKKEI225[2026-09-30] - NIKKEI225[2026-06-30]) / NIKKEI225[2026-06-30] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NIKKEI225 (2026-09-30)
119. NIKKEI225.pct_ytd = (NIKKEI225[2026-09-30] - NIKKEI225[2025-12-30]) / NIKKEI225[2025-12-30] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NIKKEI225 (2026-09-30)
120. LRHUTTTTJPM156S.latest = LRHUTTTTJPM156S[2026-07-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LRHUTTTTJPM156S (2026-09-15)
121. CA10Y.latest = CA10Y[2026-09-29] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-10-03)
122. CA10Y.chg_qtd = CA10Y[2026-09-29] - CA10Y[2026-06-30] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-10-03)
123. CA10Y.chg_ytd = CA10Y[2026-09-29] - CA10Y[2025-12-31] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-10-03)
124. CA2Y.chg_qtd = CA2Y[2026-09-29] - CA2Y[2026-06-30] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-10-03)
125. CA2Y.chg_ytd = CA2Y[2026-09-29] - CA2Y[2025-12-31] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-10-03)
126. NGDPRSAXDCCAQ.pct_qoq = (NGDPRSAXDCCAQ[2026-04-01] - NGDPRSAXDCCAQ[2026-01-01]) / NGDPRSAXDCCAQ[2026-01-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NGDPRSAXDCCAQ (2026-09-07)
127. NGDPRSAXDCCAQ.pct_yoy = (NGDPRSAXDCCAQ[2026-04-01] - NGDPRSAXDCCAQ[2025-04-01]) / NGDPRSAXDCCAQ[2025-04-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NGDPRSAXDCCAQ (2026-09-07)
128. LRUNTTTTCAM156S.latest = LRUNTTTTCAM156S[2026-08-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LRUNTTTTCAM156S (2026-09-15)
129. LRUNTTTTCAM156S.chg_ytd = LRUNTTTTCAM156S[2026-08-01] - LRUNTTTTCAM156S[2025-12-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LRUNTTTTCAM156S (2026-09-15)
130. Adapting to structural forces, navigating uncertainty ¶5 — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2026/09/adapting-structural-forces-navigating-uncertainty/ (2026-09-21)
131. BAMLEMCBPIOAS.latest = BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-09-30] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMCBPIOAS (2026-09-30)
132. BAMLEMCBPIOAS.chg_qtd = BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-09-30] - BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-06-30] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMCBPIOAS (2026-09-30)
133. BAMLEMCBPIOAS.chg_mtd = BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-09-30] - BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-08-31] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMCBPIOAS (2026-09-30)
134. BAMLEMCBPIOAS.chg_ytd = BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-09-30] - BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2025-12-31] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMCBPIOAS (2026-09-30)
135. BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS.latest = BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-09-30] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS (2026-09-30)
136. BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS.chg_qtd = BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-09-30] - BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-06-30] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS (2026-09-30)
137. BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS.chg_mtd = BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-09-30] - BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-08-31] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS (2026-09-30)
138. DTWEXEMEGS.pct_qtd = (DTWEXEMEGS[2026-09-25] - DTWEXEMEGS[2026-06-30]) / DTWEXEMEGS[2026-06-30] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXEMEGS (2026-09-28)
139. DEXKOUS.chg_qtd = DEXKOUS[2026-09-25] - DEXKOUS[2026-06-30] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXKOUS (2026-09-28)
140. VXEEMCLS.pct_qtd = (VXEEMCLS[2026-09-30] - VXEEMCLS[2026-06-30]) / VXEEMCLS[2026-06-30] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/VXEEMCLS (2026-09-30)
141. VXEEMCLS.pct_mtd = (VXEEMCLS[2026-09-30] - VXEEMCLS[2026-08-31]) / VXEEMCLS[2026-08-31] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/VXEEMCLS (2026-09-30)
142. Eliminating Disease-Carrying Pests And Restoring Enjoyment Of The Great Outdoors ¶4 — https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/09/eliminating-disease-carrying-pests-and-restoring-enjoyment-of-the-great-outdoors/ (2026-09-29)
143. Eliminating Disease-Carrying Pests And Restoring Enjoyment Of The Great Outdoors ¶25 — https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/09/eliminating-disease-carrying-pests-and-restoring-enjoyment-of-the-great-outdoors/ (2026-09-29)
144. Inaugurating The Era Of Super Intelligence ¶5 — https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/09/inaugurating-the-era-of-super-intelligence/ (2026-09-29)