# Briefing — the three months to 18 September 2026
*The quarter belonged to bond markets, not equities. Real and nominal yields rose sharply across the United States, the euro area and Japan, with the largest moves at the short end in Europe and Japan, and the dollar weakened against the renminbi. Growth still runs above trend while inflation pressure sits below it, and the overheating regime persisted through the quarter rather than breaking.*
## Equities
Equities added little over the three months, and what gains there were went to the broad market rather than to technology. The large-cap US index rose +1.8%1 over the three months to the middle of September, or +137.182 index points, while the Nasdaq composite fell -0.4%3, or -99.634 points, across the same span. The large-cap index closed at 7,637.765 and the Nasdaq at 26,418.306. Both stand far above their levels of a year earlier, up +15.2%7 and +17.6%8 respectively, so the three months interrupted the annual advance rather than reversing it. The distinction matters for how the quarter should be read. A reversal would imply that the conditions which produced the annual gain had themselves turned; an interruption implies only that one of those conditions, the discount rate, moved against the market while the others held. The evidence in this piece supports the second reading, because the same quarter in which equities stalled was the quarter in which yields rose across every maturity and growth ran above trend.
The rotation within the equity market is the more informative part of the move. The broad index gained while the technology-weighted index lost ground, and the gap between them opened over a period in which real yields rose. Long-duration equity earnings are discounted at a rate that moved higher, and the index most exposed to that arithmetic is the one that fell. Nothing in the quarter suggests a deterioration in the earnings side of the equation; activity accelerated and the labour market tightened. The pressure came from the denominator.
The final month ran against the quarter's own direction. The large-cap index fell -0.7%9 over the month to the middle of September and -0.3%10 over the final week, while the Nasdaq rose +0.5%11 and +0.3%12 over the same two windows. Neither index is near its extreme. The large-cap index sits below its twelve-month high of 7,798.9913 and far above its low of 6,343.7214; the Nasdaq sits below 27,093.9015 and far above 20,794.6416. The quarter was therefore a stall at an elevated level, not a drawdown, and the equity market gave up leadership to fixed income without giving up ground. Within the quarter, the final month reversed the ranking of the two indices, which argues against reading the technology underperformance as a settled trend. The positions of both indices inside their twelve-month ranges say the same thing: each sits well above its low and close enough to its high that the quarter registers as a pause in an advance.
A resumption of the annual advance is likely to require the long end of the curve to stop rising, since the flat quarter came with yields climbing. If the technology index regains its relative advance, the pressure from rates has eased; if it continues to lag the broad market, that pressure persists. A fall through the twelve-month troughs would mark a change in the equity market alone and would say nothing about the growth and inflation gaps that define the macro regime.
## Monetary policy
Policy tightened in the quarter rather than easing. The September decision was to "raise the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/4 percentage point to 3-3/4 to 4 percent"17, which reversed the hold agreed at the previous meeting and marked the front end as the active part of the policy stance. That reversal explains why short rates in the United States moved with, and not against, the broader rise in yields across the quarter. A hold followed by an increase is a different signal from a sequence of increases: it tells the market that the Committee was willing to change course inside a quarter when the data warranted, which raises the sensitivity of the front end to each subsequent print.
The stated grounds were the level of prices alongside firm activity. The Committee recorded that "Economic activity is expanding at a solid pace"18 and that "Inflation remains elevated"19, adding that "Today's policy action will support a timelier return to the Committee's 2 percent goal"19. The level and the momentum are separate things, and the quarter showed them moving apart: in early September Governor Waller said that "recent data suggest we are finally seeing some signs of disinflation"20 and that "Three-month inflation has fallen steadily from 4.76 percent in February"21. He also said he did "n't see elevated energy prices and tariffs now as a significant source of ongoing inflation pressure"22. The hike therefore rests on the twelve-month level and on growth running strong, not on a fresh acceleration in monthly price pressure, which is consistent with subdued current inflation alongside above-trend activity. The conditional he set out was explicit: "if inflation comes in hot, I would consider a rate hike"23.
Reading the two together, the policy stance is anchored on a backward-looking measure while the forward-looking measure points the other way. That configuration is unstable in a specific sense: as the slower monthly readings accumulate, the twelve-month rate falls mechanically, and the stated grounds for tightening weaken without any new information arriving. The offsetting force is activity, which strengthened over the quarter and which the Committee named directly.
If monthly core prices continue to decelerate while growth stays firm, the Committee is likely to stop at this single increase and hold. If instead the three-month run rate turns back up, further tightening becomes the base case and the front end carries it. The observable that settles the question is the sequence of monthly core price readings before the next meeting.
## Rates and curve
The Treasury curve sold off across every maturity over the three months to the eighteenth of September, and the move was led by real yields rather than inflation compensation. The ten-year rose to 5.01%24, up +0.55pp25 over the three months and +0.90pp26 over twelve, a fresh fifty-two week high at 5.01%27. The two-year rose by the same three-month amount, +0.55pp28, to 4.74%29, and the thirty-year rose +0.45pp30 to 5.35%31. The two-to-ten spread was unchanged over the three months at 0.27%32, sitting at its fifty-two week low of 0.27%33; the steepening seen through August was given back, with the spread down -0.25pp34 over the final month.
The parallel character of the three-month move is the point. When the front end and the belly move by identical amounts and the long end moves by less, the curve is not repricing the policy path alone; it is repricing the level of rates across the whole horizon. Inside the quarter the path was not smooth. The curve steepened and then flattened back, which means the market first priced a longer policy horizon and then withdrew that pricing in the final weeks, leaving the spread at the bottom of its range for the year.
The composition of the move points to real rates. Ten-year real yields rose +0.47pp35 over the three months to 2.68%36, their fifty-two week high, while the ten-year breakeven rose only +0.08pp37 to 2.33%38, well inside its fifty-two week high of 2.50%39. The front end moved with policy: the upper bound of the federal funds target was raised to 4.00%40, +0.25pp41 above its level three months earlier, though it is still -0.25pp42 below where it stood a year ago. The decomposition is the most useful single fact in this piece. Almost the whole of the ten-year move was real, and inflation compensation barely participated. That is consistent with the policy account above: the Committee tightened against a price level rather than against an accelerating price momentum, and the market accepted the framing without raising its long-run inflation pricing. It also explains the equity pattern, because a rise in real discount rates falls most heavily on long-duration earnings.
A further flattening from here would signal that the front end is pricing more tightening than the growth path can carry. If breakevens stay near their current level while real yields keep rising, the sell-off is a growth and term-premium story rather than an inflation one. A renewed rise in inflation compensation would point the other way.
## Credit
Credit spreads did not drive the quarter. Investment grade corporate spreads ended at 0.78%43, wider by +4bp44 over the three months and by +3bp45 over twelve, leaving them close to the low of the past year at 0.73%46 and far from the high at 0.94%47. High yield spreads tell the same story, at 2.70%48 after a three-month move of +4bp49 and a twelve-month move of -1bp50, with the year's high at 3.46%51 never approached. In the final month both measures tightened, by -4bp52 in investment grade and -5bp53 in high yield, so the quarter's widening came earlier and then partly reversed.
The final-month tightening is worth separating from the quarterly figure. It came in the same weeks in which the curve flattened and the technology index outperformed, and it indicates that the risk appetite of credit investors did not deteriorate as yields rose. Spreads at the bottom of a one-year range alongside above-trend growth are internally consistent: default compensation is priced off the expected path of corporate cash flow, and that path improved over the quarter.
The damage was in duration, not in compensation for default. The investment grade total return index fell -2.2%54 over the three months and -0.6%55 over the year, while high yield lost only -0.1%56 over the quarter and gained +2.9%57 over the year. A four basis point spread move cannot account for a loss of that size in the longer-duration index; rising yields can, and the shorter, higher-coupon index was insulated. The divergence between the two total return series across twelve months makes the same point over a longer window: the index with more interest rate sensitivity lost ground over the year while the index with more credit sensitivity gained it. For a committee reading the quarter, the practical implication is that the credit allocation behaved as a rates position, and its result was determined by the Treasury move described above rather than by anything specific to corporate borrowers.
Credit will continue to transmit rate risk rather than credit risk as long as spreads stay near the bottom of their one-year range. A break above the year's spread high would mark the change in regime, and until then further total return losses in investment grade are likely to come from yields alone.
## Real assets and currencies
Crude was the dominant move of the quarter. Brent rose by +51.4558 dollars a barrel over the three months to 130.8059, and WTI rose by +26.6760 dollars to 107.0261. The gain accelerated into the final weeks: Brent added +35.5162 dollars over the last month and +12.7463 dollars in the closing week alone. Over twelve months Brent is up +62.9764 dollars, and the latest level sits near the fifty-two week high of 138.2165 against a low of 59.9366, so the quarter extended a year-long climb rather than interrupting it. The concentration of the gain in the final weeks matters for the inflation path, because the effect on headline prices arrives with a lag and much of this move had not yet passed into the consumer price readings discussed below.
The dollar moved the other way, but by far less. The broad index fell -1.8%67 over the three months to 118.2168, and the advanced-economy index fell -1.7%69 to 111.7770. Over twelve months the broad index is down -1.2%71 while the advanced-economy measure is up +1.2%72, so the quarter's softness is concentrated against emerging market currencies. Energy costs rose against a weaker dollar, adding to price pressure in dollar terms rather than offsetting it. A dollar that fell as oil rose removes the usual partial offset for a dollar-based consumer, and it also tightens the terms of trade for economies that import energy in dollars while their currencies appreciate against it.
The divergence between the two dollar measures over twelve months is the piece of this section that bears on the emerging market discussion later. The advanced-economy currencies did not drive the annual decline; the emerging market side did, and that is where the currency support for local assets has come from.
If crude holds near current levels, headline inflation is likely to rise even with underlying pressure subdued. A further fall in the broad dollar index would widen that gap, while a recovery in the dollar would narrow it.
## Macro data
Growth ran well above trend through the three months to mid-September. The Atlanta Fed nowcast stood at 5.08%73, up +3.5474 percentage points over three months and +1.6175 over twelve, and at its highest reading of the past year at 5.08%76. That reverses the soft second-quarter reading of 1.54%77 rather than extending it. The labour market matched the acceleration: payrolls reached 159,07578 thousand after gains of +18379 thousand over three months and +52780 thousand over twelve, and unemployment fell to 4.10%81, down -0.1082 over three months and -0.3083 over the year, equalling the low of the past year. The agreement between the output measure and the employment measure is what gives the growth reading its weight. A nowcast at the top of its range can reflect a single volatile component; a nowcast at the top of its range alongside payroll gains and a falling unemployment rate cannot.
Price pressure was subdued against that activity but not against the target. Headline CPI rose +0.5%84 over three months and +3.0%85 over twelve; core PCE rose +0.2%86 and +2.9%87 respectively. The three-month pace sits far below the pace of output, while both twelve-month rates remain above the stated objective, which is the level a tightening bias answers. Household sentiment recovered to 55.2088, up +11.5%89 over three months but only +0.2%90 over the year.
The gap between the three-month and twelve-month price measures is the same gap the policy section described, now visible in the data rather than in the language of a statement. It is also the reason the crude move matters: the recent readings are soft, and the energy gain arrived late enough that it has not yet tested them. The sentiment recovery over the quarter against a flat year suggests households responded to current conditions rather than to a durable change in their assessment.
The overheating combination is likely to persist while the nowcast holds near its high and unemployment holds at its floor. If the twelve-month core measure falls back toward target while payroll gains hold, the case for further tightening weakens. A renewed drop in sentiment alongside slower payrolls would be the first sign the activity run is ending.
## United Kingdom
The gilt market carried the quarter in Britain, as it did elsewhere, and the front end led. Five-year yields rose over the three months to +0.66pp91 and ended at 4.93%92, ten-year yields rose +0.64pp93 to 5.36%94, and twenty-year yields rose +0.51pp95 to 5.74%96. That extended a twelve-month repricing of +0.93pp97 at five years. Bank Rate did not move over the three months, and overnight rates were unchanged, so the whole adjustment sat in term premium and expected policy beyond the next meeting. Sterling gained +0.029698 against the dollar to 1.352499, leaving it near flat over the year.
The British case isolates a component that the American case mixes together. In the United States the front end moved with an actual policy change; in Britain the policy rate was static and the curve still repriced by a comparable order across maturities. What moved was the expected path and the compensation demanded for holding duration, and it moved without any action by the Committee. That makes the gilt move a cleaner reading of the global rate impulse described in the Treasury section.
The July decision explains the shape: the Committee voted "by a majority of 6–3 to maintain Bank Rate at 3.75%"100, judging that "the risk of strong inflationary pressures was greater than the risk of weak inflationary pressures"101. A divided vote alongside an asymmetric assessment of risk gives the market a reason to price a higher path even from a hold, which is consistent with the front end leading. Sterling's stability against a dollar that weakened over the quarter is the counterpart of that repricing.
If evidence of second-round effects in pay settlements emerges, the next move in Bank Rate is up rather than down. If energy prices subside instead, short gilt yields are likely to retrace faster than long ones.
## Euro area
The euro area's move was in rates, and it was concentrated at the short end. The two-year yield rose to 3.17%102, up +0.61pp103 over the three months to mid-September, while the ten-year rose to 3.53%104, up +0.55pp105 and within a basis point of its fifty-two week high of 3.54%106. The quarter extended the year's run, with the two-year up +1.19pp107 over twelve months. Credit and currency were quiet by comparison: high-yield spreads widened +0.15pp108 to 2.74%109 and are unchanged over twelve months, and the euro gained +0.0134110 against the dollar to 1.1604111.
The pattern repeats the one seen in the United States and Britain. The rate market did the work, credit did not, and the currency moved modestly. Where the euro area differs is that the short end led by a clear margin and the twelve-month repricing at two years was larger still, which places this quarter inside a longer tightening sequence rather than at its start.
Policy drove it. The Governing Council raised the deposit rate to 2.50%112, citing a conflict that continues to generate inflation pressures, and inflation is set to remain well above target for an extended period113, with growth revised up on the greater than expected resilience of the euro area economy114. Consumer prices were +3.1%115 higher over twelve months while output rose +0.8%116. The stated combination is the same one the Federal Reserve named: prices above target and activity firmer than assumed. The difference is that the euro area arrived at it with weaker measured output growth, which makes the resilience language a statement about the path relative to prior expectation rather than about the level of activity.
Further tightening is likely if underlying inflation holds above target through the autumn prints. A retreat in energy prices would ease the short end first.
## Japan
Japan's bond market carried the quarter while equities gave back ground. The two-year rose to 1.87%117, up +47bp118 over the three months and +98bp119 over the year, the largest move on the curve; the ten-year reached 2.99%120 after +36bp121, and the thirty-year 4.05%122 after +31bp123. The Nikkei fell -9.7%124 over the same three months, interrupting a year still up +41.6%125. The yen strengthened, with the dollar rate down -7.66126 to 153.71127.
Japan shows the sharpest version of the equity-rates trade-off in this piece. The curve rose most at the front, the currency appreciated, and the equity index gave back a substantial part of a large annual gain. All three are consequences of the same policy turn, and the equity fall is the largest in the piece while the annual position remains strongly positive, so the quarter interrupted the run rather than ending it.
Policy drove the front end. The Bank of Japan raised the overnight call rate target, judging that underlying CPI inflation has been approaching 2 percent128 and that there is a risk that it will deviate upward to a level above the price stability target of 2 percent128. Activity supported it: real GDP was +1.1%129 higher over the year and unemployment fell to 2.40%130. The Bank's stated justification is forward-looking, resting on the risk of overshoot rather than on a realised one, which is a lower bar for further action than the language used elsewhere.
Further tightening is likely if consumer price increases keep spilling over from business-to-business prices, and the short end would lead again. Should the yen keep appreciating, the pass-through the Bank names as its trigger weakens and the pace of increases may slow.
## Canada
Canadian yields joined the global move higher, with the front end leading. The two-year rose to 3.35%131, up +57bp132 over the three months and +87bp133 over the year, while the ten-year rose to 3.92%134, up +54bp135 on the quarter and +73bp136 on the year. Both sit near their twelve-month highs of 3.37%137 and 3.95%138. The move extended, rather than interrupted, the run of the previous periods.
Policy did not do the work. The Bank of Canada held at 2.25%139 through the quarter, unchanged over twelve months apart from -25bp140, and in September noted that "Long-term bond yields have moved up globally, including in Canada."141 Labour market slack narrowed, with unemployment at 6.40%142, down -0.70pp143 on the year. The Canadian dollar firmed against the US dollar, to 1.3864144 from -0.0278145 over three months.
Canada is the clearest case of an imported rate move. The policy rate was held, the direction of the past year's policy change was downward, and the curve still rose across maturities to sit near its highs for the year. The Bank's own language locates the source outside the domestic policy setting. Taken with the British case, where policy was also static, this leaves two of the major curves in the piece repricing without a domestic policy trigger, which strengthens the reading that the global rate impulse described in the Treasury section is the common factor. The narrowing of labour market slack removes one argument for expecting that impulse to be resisted domestically.
Front-end yields are likely to keep rising if core inflation measures move away from target. A decline in gasoline prices would instead point to an earlier easing.
## Emerging markets
Emerging market credit tightened through the three months to mid-September, extending the year's move rather than interrupting it. Corporate spreads ended at 1.34%146, narrower by 0.07pp147 over three months and 0.10pp148 over twelve, close to the year's low of 1.31%149. High yield spreads at 2.81%150 were 0.17pp151 tighter over the quarter. This is the one credit market in the piece that tightened rather than widened over the quarter, and the tightening was larger in the riskier tier, which is the ordering that indicates appetite rather than mechanical index effects.
The dollar did the work. The emerging market dollar index fell 1.9%152 over three months and 3.5%153 over twelve, with the renminbi at 6.7080154 and the won stronger by 200.34155. The rupee was the exception, weaker by 1.220156. Implied equity volatility fell 28.0%157 over the quarter but sits 55.9%158 above a year ago.
The dollar figures here connect directly to the currency section. The broad dollar index fell more over twelve months than the advanced-economy index did, and the emerging market measure fell further again, which identifies where the annual dollar weakness was concentrated. Currency strength of that kind reduces the local cost of servicing dollar liabilities and supports the spread compression recorded above. The volatility reading qualifies the picture: the quarter brought a substantial decline, but the level remains well above where it stood a year ago, so the improvement is recent rather than established.
Further spread tightening is likely only if the dollar keeps falling against Asian currencies. A renewed rise in implied volatility toward its twelve-month high would point the other way.
## Fiscal and trade policy
Fiscal and trade policy produced no measurable instrument over the three months to the middle of September; the period's executive output was sectoral rather than macroeconomic. The single order issued at the end of the period addressed federal fisheries management, directing agencies to "eliminate unnecessary restrictions that harm our coastal economies"159 and to modernize catch data collection. Nothing in that instrument bears on aggregate borrowing, aggregate taxation or the general level of import costs.
The trade content of the period is confined to that order's instruction that named agencies "actively address international and domestic barriers to sustainable shark fisheries"160, alongside a review of listings and fisheries agreements. This is a narrow sectoral measure, and no broader tariff or border measure was set in the period. The remainder of the executive record is appointment withdrawals and a commemorative proclamation.
The relevance of this section is negative, and it is the stronger for it. The quarter's defining move was a rise in real yields across the curve, and one standing explanation for such a move is a change in the supply of government debt or in the cost of imported goods. Neither channel was activated in this period. That narrows the set of available explanations for the rate move to the policy decisions recorded above and to the term premium component, and it means the rate impulse cannot be attributed to a domestic fiscal or trade action inside the window.
Fiscal and trade policy is unlikely to account for the next leg in yields, since no measure of aggregate size was enacted in the period. The condition that would change this is the appearance of a borrowing or tariff instrument large enough to register in aggregate flows.
## Regime
The regime did not change over the three months to the middle of September. The classification stayed at overheating, and it matched the prior classification, so the quarter continued the run rather than interrupting it. Growth sits above trend while inflation pressure sits below it, and that combination is what the overheating label rests on. The transition probabilities point overwhelmingly to the same state persisting into the next period, with contraction, goldilocks and stagflation all carrying small weight.
The drivers are the two gaps themselves. The growth gap is positive but small, which is why the classification is held rather than reinforced, and the inflation gap is negative by a wider margin, which keeps the reading away from stagflation. No document in the pack records a decision or statement bearing on the classification, so the persistence of the regime is read from the gaps alone.
This classification sits consistently with the sections above. The activity data placed output at the top of its range for the year with the labour market tight, which is the positive growth gap. The price data placed the three-month pace well below the pace of output, which is the negative inflation gap. The equity stall, the rise in real yields and the absence of spread widening are all compatible with that state, because none of them requires a deterioration in growth or an acceleration in prices to explain. The crude move is the one input in the piece that pushes against the inflation side of the reading, and its effect on the measured gap had not yet appeared within the window.
The regime is likely to remain in overheating into the following quarter unless the growth gap turns negative. A move of the inflation gap up towards trend would shift the balance towards stagflation rather than end the overheating reading. Equity index levels are not a signal of the regime, which turns on the two gaps alone.
## Citations
1. SP500.pct_3m = (SP500[2026-09-17] - SP500[2026-06-18]) / SP500[2026-06-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-18)
2. SP500.chg_3m = SP500[2026-09-17] - SP500[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-18)
3. NASDAQCOM.pct_3m = (NASDAQCOM[2026-09-17] - NASDAQCOM[2026-06-18]) / NASDAQCOM[2026-06-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-17)
4. NASDAQCOM.chg_3m = NASDAQCOM[2026-09-17] - NASDAQCOM[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-17)
5. SP500.latest = SP500[2026-09-17] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-18)
6. NASDAQCOM.latest = NASDAQCOM[2026-09-17] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-17)
7. SP500.pct_12m = (SP500[2026-09-17] - SP500[2025-09-18]) / SP500[2025-09-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-18)
8. NASDAQCOM.pct_12m = (NASDAQCOM[2026-09-17] - NASDAQCOM[2025-09-18]) / NASDAQCOM[2025-09-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-17)
9. SP500.pct_1m = (SP500[2026-09-17] - SP500[2026-08-18]) / SP500[2026-08-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-18)
10. SP500.pct_1w = (SP500[2026-09-17] - SP500[2026-09-11]) / SP500[2026-09-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-18)
11. NASDAQCOM.pct_1m = (NASDAQCOM[2026-09-17] - NASDAQCOM[2026-08-18]) / NASDAQCOM[2026-08-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-17)
12. NASDAQCOM.pct_1w = (NASDAQCOM[2026-09-17] - NASDAQCOM[2026-09-11]) / NASDAQCOM[2026-09-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-17)
13. SP500.hi_52w = max(SP500[2025-09-22..2026-09-17]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-18)
14. SP500.lo_52w = min(SP500[2025-09-22..2026-09-17]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-18)
15. NASDAQCOM.hi_52w = max(NASDAQCOM[2025-09-22..2026-09-17]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-17)
16. NASDAQCOM.lo_52w = min(NASDAQCOM[2025-09-22..2026-09-17]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-17)
17. Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement ¶3 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260916a.htm (2026-09-16)
18. Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement ¶4 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260916a.htm (2026-09-16)
19. Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement ¶5 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260916a.htm (2026-09-16)
20. Waller, The Economic Outlook and Some Comments on My Policy Communication ¶3 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20260903a.htm (2026-09-03)
21. Waller, The Economic Outlook and Some Comments on My Policy Communication ¶15 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20260903a.htm (2026-09-03)
22. Waller, The Economic Outlook and Some Comments on My Policy Communication ¶13 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20260903a.htm (2026-09-03)
23. Waller, The Economic Outlook and Some Comments on My Policy Communication ¶20 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20260903a.htm (2026-09-03)
24. DGS10.latest = DGS10[2026-09-16] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS10 (2026-09-17)
25. DGS10.chg_3m = DGS10[2026-09-16] - DGS10[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS10 (2026-09-17)
26. DGS10.chg_12m = DGS10[2026-09-16] - DGS10[2025-09-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS10 (2026-09-17)
27. DGS10.hi_52w = max(DGS10[2025-09-22..2026-09-16]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS10 (2026-09-17)
28. DGS2.chg_3m = DGS2[2026-09-16] - DGS2[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS2 (2026-09-17)
29. DGS2.latest = DGS2[2026-09-16] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS2 (2026-09-17)
30. DGS30.chg_3m = DGS30[2026-09-16] - DGS30[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS30 (2026-09-17)
31. DGS30.latest = DGS30[2026-09-16] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS30 (2026-09-17)
32. T10Y2Y.latest = T10Y2Y[2026-09-17] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y (2026-09-17)
33. T10Y2Y.lo_52w = min(T10Y2Y[2025-09-22..2026-09-17]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y (2026-09-17)
34. T10Y2Y.chg_1m = T10Y2Y[2026-09-17] - T10Y2Y[2026-08-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y (2026-09-17)
35. DFII10.chg_3m = DFII10[2026-09-16] - DFII10[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFII10 (2026-09-17)
36. DFII10.latest = DFII10[2026-09-16] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFII10 (2026-09-17)
37. T10YIE.chg_3m = T10YIE[2026-09-17] - T10YIE[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIE (2026-09-17)
38. T10YIE.latest = T10YIE[2026-09-17] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIE (2026-09-17)
39. T10YIE.hi_52w = max(T10YIE[2025-09-22..2026-09-17]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIE (2026-09-17)
40. DFEDTARU.latest = DFEDTARU[2026-09-17] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU (2026-09-17)
41. DFEDTARU.chg_3m = DFEDTARU[2026-09-17] - DFEDTARU[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU (2026-09-17)
42. DFEDTARU.chg_12m = DFEDTARU[2026-09-17] - DFEDTARU[2025-09-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU (2026-09-17)
43. BAMLC0A0CM.latest = BAMLC0A0CM[2026-09-16] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-16)
44. BAMLC0A0CM.chg_3m = BAMLC0A0CM[2026-09-16] - BAMLC0A0CM[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-16)
45. BAMLC0A0CM.chg_12m = BAMLC0A0CM[2026-09-16] - BAMLC0A0CM[2025-09-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-16)
46. BAMLC0A0CM.lo_52w = min(BAMLC0A0CM[2025-09-22..2026-09-16]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-16)
47. BAMLC0A0CM.hi_52w = max(BAMLC0A0CM[2025-09-22..2026-09-16]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-16)
48. BAMLH0A0HYM2.latest = BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-09-16] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-09-16)
49. BAMLH0A0HYM2.chg_3m = BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-09-16] - BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-09-16)
50. BAMLH0A0HYM2.chg_12m = BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-09-16] - BAMLH0A0HYM2[2025-09-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-09-16)
51. BAMLH0A0HYM2.hi_52w = max(BAMLH0A0HYM2[2025-09-22..2026-09-16]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-09-16)
52. BAMLC0A0CM.chg_1m = BAMLC0A0CM[2026-09-16] - BAMLC0A0CM[2026-08-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-16)
53. BAMLH0A0HYM2.chg_1m = BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-09-16] - BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-08-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-09-16)
54. BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV.pct_3m = (BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-09-16] - BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-06-18]) / BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-06-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV (2026-09-16)
55. BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV.pct_12m = (BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-09-16] - BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2025-09-18]) / BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2025-09-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV (2026-09-16)
56. BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV.pct_3m = (BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-09-16] - BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-06-18]) / BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-06-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV (2026-09-16)
57. BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV.pct_12m = (BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-09-16] - BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2025-09-18]) / BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2025-09-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV (2026-09-16)
58. DCOILBRENTEU.chg_3m = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-15] - DCOILBRENTEU[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-16)
59. DCOILBRENTEU.latest = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-15] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-16)
60. DCOILWTICO.chg_3m = DCOILWTICO[2026-09-15] - DCOILWTICO[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILWTICO (2026-09-16)
61. DCOILWTICO.latest = DCOILWTICO[2026-09-15] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILWTICO (2026-09-16)
62. DCOILBRENTEU.chg_1m = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-15] - DCOILBRENTEU[2026-08-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-16)
63. DCOILBRENTEU.chg_1w = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-15] - DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-16)
64. DCOILBRENTEU.chg_12m = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-15] - DCOILBRENTEU[2025-09-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-16)
65. DCOILBRENTEU.hi_52w = max(DCOILBRENTEU[2025-09-22..2026-09-15]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-16)
66. DCOILBRENTEU.lo_52w = min(DCOILBRENTEU[2025-09-22..2026-09-15]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-16)
67. DTWEXBGS.pct_3m = (DTWEXBGS[2026-09-11] - DTWEXBGS[2026-06-18]) / DTWEXBGS[2026-06-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXBGS (2026-09-14)
68. DTWEXBGS.latest = DTWEXBGS[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXBGS (2026-09-14)
69. DTWEXAFEGS.pct_3m = (DTWEXAFEGS[2026-09-11] - DTWEXAFEGS[2026-06-18]) / DTWEXAFEGS[2026-06-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXAFEGS (2026-09-14)
70. DTWEXAFEGS.latest = DTWEXAFEGS[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXAFEGS (2026-09-14)
71. DTWEXBGS.pct_12m = (DTWEXBGS[2026-09-11] - DTWEXBGS[2025-09-18]) / DTWEXBGS[2025-09-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXBGS (2026-09-14)
72. DTWEXAFEGS.pct_12m = (DTWEXAFEGS[2026-09-11] - DTWEXAFEGS[2025-09-18]) / DTWEXAFEGS[2025-09-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXAFEGS (2026-09-14)
73. GDPNOW.latest = GDPNOW[2026-07-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPNOW (2026-09-17)
74. GDPNOW.chg_3m = GDPNOW[2026-07-01] - GDPNOW[2026-04-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPNOW (2026-09-17)
75. GDPNOW.chg_12m = GDPNOW[2026-07-01] - GDPNOW[2025-07-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPNOW (2026-09-17)
76. GDPNOW.hi_52w = max(GDPNOW[2025-10-01..2026-07-01]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPNOW (2026-09-17)
77. Atlanta Fed GDPNow real GDP nowcast, SAAR — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPNOW (2026-07-28)
78. PAYEMS.latest = PAYEMS[2026-08-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS (2026-09-04)
79. PAYEMS.chg_3m = PAYEMS[2026-08-01] - PAYEMS[2026-06-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS (2026-09-04)
80. PAYEMS.chg_12m = PAYEMS[2026-08-01] - PAYEMS[2025-09-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS (2026-09-04)
81. UNRATE.latest = UNRATE[2026-08-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE (2026-09-04)
82. UNRATE.chg_3m = UNRATE[2026-08-01] - UNRATE[2026-06-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE (2026-09-04)
83. UNRATE.chg_12m = UNRATE[2026-08-01] - UNRATE[2025-09-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE (2026-09-04)
84. CPIAUCSL.pct_3m = (CPIAUCSL[2026-08-01] - CPIAUCSL[2026-06-01]) / CPIAUCSL[2026-06-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL (2026-09-11)
85. CPIAUCSL.pct_12m = (CPIAUCSL[2026-08-01] - CPIAUCSL[2025-09-01]) / CPIAUCSL[2025-09-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL (2026-09-11)
86. PCEPILFE.pct_3m = (PCEPILFE[2026-07-01] - PCEPILFE[2026-06-01]) / PCEPILFE[2026-06-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPILFE (2026-08-26)
87. PCEPILFE.pct_12m = (PCEPILFE[2026-07-01] - PCEPILFE[2025-09-01]) / PCEPILFE[2025-09-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPILFE (2026-08-26)
88. UMCSENT.latest = UMCSENT[2026-07-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UMCSENT (2026-07-31)
89. UMCSENT.pct_3m = (UMCSENT[2026-07-01] - UMCSENT[2026-06-01]) / UMCSENT[2026-06-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UMCSENT (2026-07-31)
90. UMCSENT.pct_12m = (UMCSENT[2026-07-01] - UMCSENT[2025-09-01]) / UMCSENT[2025-09-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UMCSENT (2026-07-31)
91. GB5Y.chg_3m = GB5Y[2026-09-15] - GB5Y[2026-06-18] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-17)
92. GB5Y.latest = GB5Y[2026-09-15] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-17)
93. GB10Y.chg_3m = GB10Y[2026-09-15] - GB10Y[2026-06-18] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-17)
94. GB10Y.latest = GB10Y[2026-09-15] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-17)
95. GB20Y.chg_3m = GB20Y[2026-09-15] - GB20Y[2026-06-18] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-17)
96. GB20Y.latest = GB20Y[2026-09-15] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-17)
97. GB5Y.chg_12m = GB5Y[2026-09-15] - GB5Y[2025-09-18] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-17)
98. DEXUSUK.chg_3m = DEXUSUK[2026-09-11] - DEXUSUK[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXUSUK (2026-09-14)
99. DEXUSUK.latest = DEXUSUK[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXUSUK (2026-09-14)
100. Bank Rate maintained at 3.75% - July 2026 Monetary Policy Summary and Minutes ¶0 — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-summary-and-minutes/2026/july-2026 (2026-07-30)
101. Bank Rate maintained at 3.75% - July 2026 Monetary Policy Summary and Minutes ¶13 — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-summary-and-minutes/2026/july-2026 (2026-07-30)
102. EA2Y.latest = EA2Y[2026-09-16] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-18)
103. EA2Y.chg_3m = EA2Y[2026-09-16] - EA2Y[2026-06-18] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-18)
104. EA10Y.latest = EA10Y[2026-09-16] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-18)
105. EA10Y.chg_3m = EA10Y[2026-09-16] - EA10Y[2026-06-18] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-18)
106. EA10Y.hi_52w = max(EA10Y[2025-09-22..2026-09-16]) — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-18)
107. EA2Y.chg_12m = EA2Y[2026-09-16] - EA2Y[2025-09-18] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-18)
108. BAMLHE00EHYIOAS.chg_3m = BAMLHE00EHYIOAS[2026-09-16] - BAMLHE00EHYIOAS[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHE00EHYIOAS (2026-09-16)
109. BAMLHE00EHYIOAS.latest = BAMLHE00EHYIOAS[2026-09-16] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHE00EHYIOAS (2026-09-16)
110. DEXUSEU.chg_3m = DEXUSEU[2026-09-11] - DEXUSEU[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXUSEU (2026-09-14)
111. DEXUSEU.latest = DEXUSEU[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXUSEU (2026-09-14)
112. EAPOL.latest = EAPOL[2026-09-18] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-18)
113. Monetary policy decisions ¶1 — https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2026/html/ecb.mp260910~314e508016.en.html (2026-09-10)
114. Monetary policy decisions ¶2 — https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2026/html/ecb.mp260910~314e508016.en.html (2026-09-10)
115. CP0000EZ19M086NEST.pct_12m = (CP0000EZ19M086NEST[2026-08-01] - CP0000EZ19M086NEST[2025-09-01]) / CP0000EZ19M086NEST[2025-09-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CP0000EZ19M086NEST (2026-09-17)
116. CLVMNACSCAB1GQEA19.pct_12m = (CLVMNACSCAB1GQEA19[2026-04-01] - CLVMNACSCAB1GQEA19[2025-07-01]) / CLVMNACSCAB1GQEA19[2025-07-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CLVMNACSCAB1GQEA19 (2026-09-07)
117. JP2Y.latest = JP2Y[2026-09-17] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-18)
118. JP2Y.chg_3m = JP2Y[2026-09-17] - JP2Y[2026-06-18] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-18)
119. JP2Y.chg_12m = JP2Y[2026-09-17] - JP2Y[2025-09-18] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-18)
120. JP10Y.latest = JP10Y[2026-09-17] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-18)
121. JP10Y.chg_3m = JP10Y[2026-09-17] - JP10Y[2026-06-18] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-18)
122. JP30Y.latest = JP30Y[2026-09-17] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-18)
123. JP30Y.chg_3m = JP30Y[2026-09-17] - JP30Y[2026-06-18] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-18)
124. NIKKEI225.pct_3m = (NIKKEI225[2026-09-17] - NIKKEI225[2026-06-18]) / NIKKEI225[2026-06-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NIKKEI225 (2026-09-17)
125. NIKKEI225.pct_12m = (NIKKEI225[2026-09-17] - NIKKEI225[2025-09-18]) / NIKKEI225[2025-09-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NIKKEI225 (2026-09-17)
126. DEXJPUS.chg_3m = DEXJPUS[2026-09-11] - DEXJPUS[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXJPUS (2026-09-14)
127. DEXJPUS.latest = DEXJPUS[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXJPUS (2026-09-14)
128. Bank of Japan monetary policy decision, 2026-09-18 ¶4 — https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/mpmdeci/mpr_2026/k260918a.pdf (2026-09-18)
129. JPNRGDPEXP.pct_12m = (JPNRGDPEXP[2026-04-01] - JPNRGDPEXP[2025-07-01]) / JPNRGDPEXP[2025-07-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JPNRGDPEXP (2026-09-07)
130. LRHUTTTTJPM156S.latest = LRHUTTTTJPM156S[2026-07-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LRHUTTTTJPM156S (2026-09-15)
131. CA2Y.latest = CA2Y[2026-09-16] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-18)
132. CA2Y.chg_3m = CA2Y[2026-09-16] - CA2Y[2026-06-18] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-18)
133. CA2Y.chg_12m = CA2Y[2026-09-16] - CA2Y[2025-09-18] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-18)
134. CA10Y.latest = CA10Y[2026-09-16] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-18)
135. CA10Y.chg_3m = CA10Y[2026-09-16] - CA10Y[2026-06-18] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-18)
136. CA10Y.chg_12m = CA10Y[2026-09-16] - CA10Y[2025-09-18] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-18)
137. CA2Y.hi_52w = max(CA2Y[2025-09-22..2026-09-16]) — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-18)
138. CA10Y.hi_52w = max(CA10Y[2025-09-22..2026-09-16]) — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-18)
139. CAPOL.latest = CAPOL[2026-09-16] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-18)
140. CAPOL.chg_12m = CAPOL[2026-09-16] - CAPOL[2025-09-18] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-18)
141. Bank of Canada maintains the policy rate at 2¼% ¶3 — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2026/09/fad-press-release-2026-09-02/ (2026-09-02)
142. LRUNTTTTCAM156S.latest = LRUNTTTTCAM156S[2026-08-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LRUNTTTTCAM156S (2026-09-15)
143. LRUNTTTTCAM156S.chg_12m = LRUNTTTTCAM156S[2026-08-01] - LRUNTTTTCAM156S[2025-09-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LRUNTTTTCAM156S (2026-09-15)
144. DEXCAUS.latest = DEXCAUS[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXCAUS (2026-09-14)
145. DEXCAUS.chg_3m = DEXCAUS[2026-09-11] - DEXCAUS[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXCAUS (2026-09-14)
146. BAMLEMCBPIOAS.latest = BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-09-16] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMCBPIOAS (2026-09-16)
147. BAMLEMCBPIOAS.chg_3m = BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-09-16] - BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMCBPIOAS (2026-09-16)
148. BAMLEMCBPIOAS.chg_12m = BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-09-16] - BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2025-09-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMCBPIOAS (2026-09-16)
149. BAMLEMCBPIOAS.lo_52w = min(BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2025-09-22..2026-09-16]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMCBPIOAS (2026-09-16)
150. BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS.latest = BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-09-16] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS (2026-09-16)
151. BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS.chg_3m = BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-09-16] - BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS (2026-09-16)
152. DTWEXEMEGS.pct_3m = (DTWEXEMEGS[2026-09-11] - DTWEXEMEGS[2026-06-18]) / DTWEXEMEGS[2026-06-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXEMEGS (2026-09-14)
153. DTWEXEMEGS.pct_12m = (DTWEXEMEGS[2026-09-11] - DTWEXEMEGS[2025-09-18]) / DTWEXEMEGS[2025-09-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXEMEGS (2026-09-14)
154. DEXCHUS.latest = DEXCHUS[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXCHUS (2026-09-14)
155. DEXKOUS.chg_3m = DEXKOUS[2026-09-11] - DEXKOUS[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXKOUS (2026-09-14)
156. DEXINUS.chg_3m = DEXINUS[2026-09-11] - DEXINUS[2026-06-18] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXINUS (2026-09-14)
157. VXEEMCLS.pct_3m = (VXEEMCLS[2026-09-16] - VXEEMCLS[2026-06-18]) / VXEEMCLS[2026-06-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/VXEEMCLS (2026-09-16)
158. VXEEMCLS.pct_12m = (VXEEMCLS[2026-09-16] - VXEEMCLS[2025-09-18]) / VXEEMCLS[2025-09-18] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/VXEEMCLS (2026-09-16)
159. RESTORING AMERICAN SALTWATER ANGLING AND RECREATION ¶3 — https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/09/restoring-american-saltwater-angling-and-recreation/ (2026-09-17)
160. RESTORING AMERICAN SALTWATER ANGLING AND RECREATION ¶24 — https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/09/restoring-american-saltwater-angling-and-recreation/ (2026-09-17)