# Briefing — the three months to 11 September 2026
*The economy stays in overheating, and the quarter's bond moves confirm it. Long and short yields rose together in America, the euro area and Japan, and American real yields rose with them. This was not a growth scare; it was the price of money repricing higher across every major market at once. The run continued rather than broke, and the dollar softened against the yuan.*
## Equities
Equities rose over the quarter, then gave part of it back. The S&P was +3.6%1 over the three months to the eleventh of September, and the Nasdaq Composite was +2.0%2. Over twelve months the gains were larger: the S&P at +16.2%3 and the Nasdaq Composite at +19.5%4. The run of the past year continued, but the last weeks of the quarter ran the other way.
The gap between the quarterly and annual numbers is the story. Most of the year's advance was banked before this quarter opened. What the past three months added was thin by comparison, and the thinness came at the end rather than the start.
The late slippage was broad. The S&P was -0.8%5 on the week to the eleventh of September, and the Nasdaq Composite was -0.7%6. On the month the S&P was -0.9%7 and the Nasdaq Composite -0.4%8. Both indices fell together, and the two lost ground by similar amounts. That argues against a rotation between growth and value and for a common cause acting on both.
Both indices closed the period below their highs of the past year: the S&P at 7,656.989 against a high of 7,798.9910, and the Nasdaq Composite at 26,333.0411 against 27,093.9012. The S&P had stood at 7,728.213 on the eleventh of August, above where it ended the period. Equity prices kept rising while the price of money repriced higher, and only in the closing weeks did the two pull apart.
That divergence matters because it dates the change. For most of the quarter, shares absorbed dearer money without complaint. The discount rate applied to future profits rose, and prices rose anyway, which only holds if expected profits rise with it. In the final weeks the arithmetic stopped being ignored.
The quarter's gain is likely to hold only if earnings keep pace with the higher cost of money. The condition to watch is the direction of long yields: further rises point to more of the late-quarter drift, while a pause in them points back to the twelve-month run. A break below the year's lows would mark a reversal rather than a pause, and nothing in this period has come near that. On the evidence of this quarter the drawdown is a correction inside a rising market, not the start of a new direction.
## Monetary policy
The Federal Reserve left policy unchanged through the quarter. At its July meeting the Committee decided to "maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 3-1/2 to 3-3/4 percent"14, holding the setting steady rather than extending the earlier run of cuts. The decision was not unanimous: the statement was approved "by a 9 – 3 vote"15. Three dissenters "preferred to raise the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/4 percentage point at this meeting"16.
The direction of the dissent is the point. A committee that pauses after cutting can be read as waiting for more evidence. A committee whose minority wants to tighten is closer to the end of the easing than to a resumption of it. The dissenters did not ask for patience; they asked for a higher rate.
The pause rests on inflation that has not returned to target. The Committee wrote that "Inflation remains elevated relative to the Committee's 2 percent goal"17, and pointed to supply shocks in energy among the causes. That framing carries a tension. Supply shocks are usually treated as temporary and looked through, yet the Committee stopped cutting all the same.
Governor Waller set out the same picture with a softer edge in early September, noting that "Three-month inflation has fallen steadily from 4.76 percent in February"18. On that basis he said that, if the improvement held, "I would be inclined to support holding the target for the federal funds rate at its current setting"19. He also judged that "policy is currently only slightly restricting aggregate demand"20, and added that "if inflation comes in hot, I would consider a rate hike"20. Activity gave the Committee no reason to move either way: it described the economy as "expanding at a solid pace"21.
Read together, those remarks describe a setting that is barely tight at all. If policy only slightly restrains demand, then a hold is not a brake but something closer to neutral. That leaves the burden of disinflation resting on supply and on the passage of time.
The observable that settles the next decision is the August inflation reading, and the reaction function around it has been stated plainly. Continued disinflation in that reading points to a further hold, while an upside surprise points to a rise in the target range. With the easing cycle already interrupted and dissents running towards tightening, the balance of risk around the policy rate has shifted away from further cuts. Should longer-term inflation expectations climb, that shift would harden quickly.
## Rates and curve
American yields rose across every maturity over the three months to the middle of September. The two-year Treasury yield rose by 0.5122 percentage points to 4.5623%, its highest in a year. The ten-year Treasury yield rose by 0.5024 percentage points to 4.9525%, also a twelve-month high. The thirty-year Treasury yield rose by 0.4226 percentage points to 5.3727%, matching its own high for the year.
A parallel move of that kind is unusual and informative. When only the short end moves, the market is repricing the next few policy meetings. When the whole curve lifts together, it is repricing the resting level of rates over years. This was the second kind.
The gap between ten-year and two-year yields narrowed by 0.0728 percentage points to 0.3329%, close to its narrowest of the past year at 0.2730%. The run of the preceding year continued rather than broke: over twelve months the two-year yield rose 1.0431 percentage points and the ten-year 0.9432. A curve this flat with yields this high says the market expects the current setting to persist, not to be relieved.
The move was in the real price of money, not in expected inflation. The ten-year inflation-protected yield rose by 0.3933 percentage points to 2.5534%, the highest in a year. The ten-year breakeven inflation rate, the compensation investors demand for future inflation, rose only 0.0735 percentage points to 2.3636%, inside its range for the year.
That split is the most important fact in the section. Rising real yields raise the hurdle for every investment financed at market rates, and they do so without any loss of confidence in the inflation target. Policy did not drive it either. The upper bound of the federal funds target was unchanged over the three months at 3.7537%, having been cut by 0.7538 percentage points over the preceding year. Neither the central bank nor inflation compensation moved the curve; the required real return did.
With the policy rate held and real yields at their highs, the next move in American rates is more likely up than down. The observable that settles it is the breakeven rate: if it climbs out of its recent range, short yields rise further and the curve flattens again. Should breakevens fall back while real yields hold, the pressure sits on long maturities instead.
## Credit
Investment-grade credit lost money this quarter, and the loss came from yields rather than from credit. The corporate index spread widened by 0.0539 percentage points over the three months, to 0.8040%. That sits close to the low end of the past year's range, which ran from 0.7341% to 0.9442%. High-yield moved the other way: the spread narrowed by 0.0843 percentage points over the three months, to 2.7044%, against a twelve-month low of 2.6045%.
The two spreads moving apart is the first clue. If investors were pricing a weaker economy, the riskier index would widen first and by more. It did the opposite, and finished the quarter near the tightest level of its year.
The total return figures show where the damage sat. The investment-grade total return index fell 2.0%46 over the three months and 0.7%47 over the year. The high-yield total return index rose 0.4%48 over the three months and 3.4%49 over the year.
Long duration was the cost, not default risk: the higher-yielding, shorter-duration index gained while the longer-duration one lost, with both spreads still near their yearly lows. That is the pattern of a market repricing the cost of money, not one pricing a slowdown. Investment-grade bonds carry more interest-rate sensitivity and thinner spread cushions, so the rise in Treasury yields fell on them almost in full. High-yield bonds carry a larger coupon and shorter lives, and their spread tightening offset the yield move.
The link back to the rates section is direct. Real yields rose; long duration lost; borrowers were not punished. Credit markets were not signalling anything about corporate health this quarter, and reading the investment-grade loss as a credit warning would be a mistake.
Credit is likely to keep absorbing higher yields without stress as long as high-yield spreads hold near their lows. A widening in the high-yield spread back toward the top of its yearly range would mark the change, and would point to a growth problem rather than a rates problem. Absent that, further investment-grade losses say more about duration than about borrowers.
## Real assets and currencies
Oil led the quarter. Brent crude rose by 16.6750 dollars a barrel over the three months to 109.5151 dollars, and West Texas Intermediate rose by 5.6852 dollars to 97.2653 dollars. Both gains came late: Brent added 16.2554 dollars in the final month alone, and WTI added 12.4955 dollars.
The timing matters as much as the size. Almost the whole of the quarter's rise in crude arrived in its closing weeks, the same weeks in which equities slipped. A supply shock late in the period will pass into fuel and freight costs in the months after it, not the months before.
Over twelve months Brent is up 42.2656 dollars, so the quarter continued a run rather than starting one. Brent still sits below its twelve-month high of 138.2157 dollars and well above the low of 59.9358 dollars. There is room in the range for the move to extend.
The dollar went the other way. The broad trade-weighted dollar index fell 1.7%59 over the three months to 118.0760, and is down 1.6%61 on the year. Against advanced-economy currencies alone the dollar fell 1.1%62 to 111.7463, but is still up 1.0%64 over twelve months.
The difference between those two measures locates the weakness. Against rich-country currencies the dollar gave back part of a gain it still holds over the year. Against the broader basket it has lost ground on both horizons. The softness is wider than the advanced economies alone.
A cheaper dollar and dearer crude both push imported costs up at once. Oil is priced in dollars, so a falling dollar raises the local cost of a barrel even before the barrel itself gets dearer. For the United States the effect runs through the import bill instead.
If crude holds near these levels, headline inflation will rise again into the next quarter and keep policy tight. A rebound in the broad dollar index back through its twelve-month range would blunt that, and its failure to rebound would confirm the overheating reading.
## Macro data
American consumer prices rose 0.5%65 over the three months to August, and stood +3.0%66 above a year earlier. The index itself, at 334.1367, is the highest of the past year, matching the twelve-month high of 334.1368. Core personal consumption prices tell the same story more slowly, up 0.2%69 over three months and +2.9%70 on the year.
The gap between the two measures is the useful part. Headline prices are running faster than the core measure, which is what an energy shock looks like in the data. The core rate on the year still sits above the Committee's stated goal, so the overshoot is not confined to fuel.
Measured against the Federal Reserve's stated goal, that is an overshoot, not a shortfall; a statistical reference path fitted to the wider regime can sit below the observed series without contradicting it.
Growth drove the prices. The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow estimate for the third quarter reached 4.4271%, up 2.8872 percentage points from the second-quarter reading and the highest of the past year. That is a large step up in a single quarter, and it points to demand rather than supply as the binding force.
Employers added 18373 thousand jobs over the three months to August, taking payrolls to 159,07574 thousand. Unemployment fell by 0.1075 percentage points to 4.1076%, the low of the past year. Households noticed: the University of Michigan sentiment index rose 11.5%77 over three months to 55.2078.
Falling unemployment alongside accelerating output leaves little slack to absorb the energy shock. That is the condition in which a supply-driven price rise spreads into wages and services instead of fading.
Demand this strong keeps price pressure alive into the final quarter. The observable that settles it is the monthly core personal consumption reading: another quarter at this pace confirms the overheating call, while a run of flat months would mark the turn.
## United Kingdom
British gilt yields rose across the curve over the three months, and the rise reached the long end. The ten-year gilt yield stood at 5.1979%, up 0.3180 percentage points over the three months and at its highest of the past year. The five-year yield rose 0.3081 percentage points and the twenty-year yield rose 0.2882 percentage points.
The evenness of the move is the same pattern seen in Treasuries. Short, medium and long maturities all repriced by similar amounts, which points to a change in the expected resting level of rates rather than to a view on the next few meetings.
Over twelve months the ten-year yield is up 0.5783 percentage points, so the quarter continued the run rather than broke it. Gilts have been repricing for a year, and this quarter added to it rather than correcting it.
Bank Rate did not move, holding at 3.7584%. The Monetary Policy Committee split, voting by a majority of 6–3 to maintain Bank Rate at 3.75%"85, and judged the risk of strong inflationary pressures was greater than the risk of weak inflationary pressures86.
That judgement is a clear statement of asymmetry. The Committee is not balanced between the two errors; it names one as the larger. A hold taken on that basis is closer to a tightening bias than to a neutral one, and the size of the minority underlines it.
Sterling firmed by +0.018487 against the dollar over the three months. That move sits with the wider dollar softness rather than against it, and a firmer pound takes a little of the sting out of dearer crude for British importers.
If pay settlements for the coming year come in above the rates consistent with target, the long end is likely to price a higher terminal rate still. A durable fall in energy prices would point the other way and allow the cutting cycle to resume.
## Euro area
Euro area yields rose across the curve in the three months to the September date. The ten-year benchmark yield climbed 0.4288 percentage points to 3.5089%, its highest in a year. The two-year yield rose more, by 0.4990 percentage points to 3.1091%, and is up 1.1592 points over twelve months. This continued the run rather than broke it.
The short end leading is the distinguishing feature here. In the United States the move was spread evenly and came from real yields. In the euro area the front of the curve moved most, which is the shape a curve takes when the central bank is actually raising rates.
The policy rate did the driving, rising 0.2593 percentage points over the quarter to 2.2594%. The Governing Council said it had decided "to raise the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points"95 because "inflation is set to remain well above target for an extended period"95.
That reasoning is worth weighing against the Federal Reserve's. Both describe inflation above goal. One paused; the other tightened. The difference lies in the starting point, since the euro area policy rate sits well below its American counterpart, leaving more ground to cover before policy restrains demand.
Consumer prices were +2.7%96 higher than a year earlier. The euro firmed by +0.010397 against the dollar over the three months. A stronger euro lowers the local price of imported energy and does part of the tightening work on its own, which limits how far the policy rate has to travel.
Further tightening is likely if energy costs keep feeding into services prices. A fall in headline inflation towards target would settle the question the other way.
## Japan
Japanese yields rose across the curve over the three months to the second week of September. The two-year yield climbed by 0.4098 percentage points to 1.8299%, and the ten-year by 0.24100 points to 2.92101%. The thirty-year yield rose by 0.17102 points to 4.00103%.
The shape is the mirror of the American one. The front of the curve moved most and the long end least, so the curve steepened at the short end rather than flattening. That is the signature of a central bank thought to be starting a tightening cycle rather than finishing one.
The run of the past year continued: the ten-year is up 1.33104 points over twelve months. Japanese long yields have travelled further over the year than their American equivalents, from a much lower base.
The Bank of Japan raised its policy rate in June and held it in July, saying it will encourage the overnight call rate "to remain at around 1.0 percent"105. It named the "risk of underlying CPI inflation deviating upward to a level above the price stability target"106.
That phrasing places the risk on the upside, and it is the same asymmetry the British committee described. A bank that has already moved once and names the upside risk has told the market where the next move points.
The yen firmed by 4.40107 yen against the dollar, and the Nikkei two-two-five ended little changed at -0.3%108 over three months. A firmer yen cuts the local cost of imported crude, which offsets part of the quarter's oil shock, and it also trims the earnings of exporters, which helps explain flat equities.
Further increases in the policy rate are likely if consumer price inflation holds above the target. A pause would follow only if crude oil prices fall back and household income growth stalls.
## Canada
Canadian yields rose across the curve over the three months, in step with the global move. The ten-year yield climbed 0.53109 percentage points to 3.94110%, its highest in a year. The two-year yield rose 0.54111 percentage points to 3.31112%, also a twelve-month high. Over the year both rose further still, the two-year by 0.81113 percentage points. This continued the run rather than broke it.
Canada is the clearest case of an imported move. The policy rate did not change and the domestic labour market improved, yet yields rose by about as much as American ones. The Bank of Canada held its policy rate at 2.25114%, unchanged over the three months, and said financial conditions had tightened, with "Long-term bond yields have moved up globally, including in Canada."115
That sentence is a central bank conceding that part of its financial conditions is set abroad. Tightening arrived without a policy decision, and it will restrain domestic borrowers all the same.
Unemployment eased to 6.40116% in July, the low of the past year. The Canadian dollar firmed, with the US dollar buying 1.3834117 Canadian dollars.
Canada sits on both sides of the quarter's two big forces. It exports oil, so dearer crude supports its terms of trade and its currency. It also faces new American duties on part of its goods trade, which works the other way on output. The net effect this quarter left the labour market at its best reading of the year.
If oil prices stay high, the Bank is likely to hold rather than cut again. A retreat in gasoline prices would reopen the case for easing.
## Emerging markets
Emerging market credit spreads narrowed through the quarter even as yields rose across the major bond markets. The spread on emerging market corporate bonds fell by 0.17118 percentage points over the three months to 1.31119%, its lowest in a year. High-yield emerging market spreads narrowed by 0.29120 percentage points to 2.79121%, also a twelve-month low.
That is the same divergence seen in American credit, only wider. Developed yields rose and emerging risk premiums fell, which only holds together if something else is easing financial conditions for these borrowers.
The dollar did the rest of the work: it fell 2.2%122 against a basket of emerging market currencies over the three months, and slipped to 6.7108123 yuan. The won gained most, with the dollar down 184.46124 won over the same span. A falling dollar lightens the burden of dollar debt directly, because the local revenue that services it buys more dollars than before.
Expected volatility in emerging market equities fell 37.0%125 over the quarter, though it rose 13.1%126 in the final week. The late rise lines up with the slippage in American equities and with the late surge in crude. It is the one part of the emerging market picture pointing the other way.
The dependence is worth stating plainly. These spreads narrowed because the dollar fell, not because developed yields were kind. The support is therefore conditional on a currency move that could reverse without warning.
A weaker dollar is the condition holding these spreads down, and a turn in it would widen them again. If volatility keeps climbing from its early September level, the credit move is the first to reverse.
## Fiscal and trade policy
Trade policy tightened rather than eased over the three months, and the tightening ran through tariffs on Canada. The President found that "Canada reneged on its commitment, ceased negotiating in good faith"127, and the suspended duties took effect. A further proclamation then narrowed and extended the measure, determining that "the public interests require modifying the scope of products subject to the additional ad valorem duties"128.
Some Canadian goods stay under the "additional ad valorem duty of 50 percent imposed pursuant to Proclamation 11048"129, while others come out from under it. The design matters for the price effect. A duty narrowed by product hits fewer goods but hits them hard, and the cost passes into the prices of whatever depends on those inputs.
The same week brought a wider claim on domestic supply, with Defense Production Act energy authorities delegated so that the Secretaries may act "independently of the other"130. Taken together, the two measures pull in the same direction: less reliance on imported supply, more cost carried at home.
The timing sets the tension. A tariff raises goods prices at the moment the energy shock is already raising them, and into an economy running without slack. That is the least forgiving moment for a tax on imports.
Tariffs applied to a close trading partner keep goods costs rising into the next quarter, which sits awkwardly with any case for lower policy rates. The condition to watch is whether Canada removes the disputed motor vehicle measures; if it does, the duties lapse and the price pressure fades, and if it does not, the pressure persists.
## Regime
The regime classification stayed in overheating, and the quarter did nothing to dislodge it. Growth continues to run above the model's reference path, and the model puts most of its weight on overheating among the four states it considers. The prior period carried the same label, so this quarter continued the run rather than interrupting it. The nearest alternative, stagflation, is the only other state with meaningful weight; contraction and goldilocks are close to dismissed.
The growth side is what drives the call. The model's inflation gap is measured against a slow-moving reference path, not against the observed price level, so it can sit below that path while consumer prices run at the top of their twelve-month range and the Committee describes inflation as elevated relative to its goal.
Read together, strong activity and firm realised prices are the overheating case, and the quarter's synchronised rise in long and short yields is its market expression. Every section of this piece tells a version of it. Real yields rose without a rise in inflation compensation. Credit losses came from duration, not from defaults. Central banks either paused with a tightening minority or raised outright. Oil rose late and the dollar fell.
The transition weights point to overheating persisting into the next period rather than giving way. The condition that would change that is the growth gap closing: if activity falls back toward the reference path while prices stay firm, the label turns to stagflation, and if both ease together, contraction. Nothing in this quarter's data points to either of those turns yet.
## Citations
1. SP500.pct_3m = (SP500[2026-09-11] - SP500[2026-06-11]) / SP500[2026-06-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-13)
2. NASDAQCOM.pct_3m = (NASDAQCOM[2026-09-11] - NASDAQCOM[2026-06-11]) / NASDAQCOM[2026-06-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-11)
3. SP500.pct_12m = (SP500[2026-09-11] - SP500[2025-09-11]) / SP500[2025-09-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-13)
4. NASDAQCOM.pct_12m = (NASDAQCOM[2026-09-11] - NASDAQCOM[2025-09-11]) / NASDAQCOM[2025-09-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-11)
5. SP500.pct_1w = (SP500[2026-09-11] - SP500[2026-09-04]) / SP500[2026-09-04] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-13)
6. NASDAQCOM.pct_1w = (NASDAQCOM[2026-09-11] - NASDAQCOM[2026-09-04]) / NASDAQCOM[2026-09-04] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-11)
7. SP500.pct_1m = (SP500[2026-09-11] - SP500[2026-08-11]) / SP500[2026-08-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-13)
8. NASDAQCOM.pct_1m = (NASDAQCOM[2026-09-11] - NASDAQCOM[2026-08-11]) / NASDAQCOM[2026-08-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-11)
9. SP500.latest = SP500[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-13)
10. SP500.hi_52w = max(SP500[2025-09-15..2026-09-11]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-13)
11. NASDAQCOM.latest = NASDAQCOM[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-11)
12. NASDAQCOM.hi_52w = max(NASDAQCOM[2025-09-15..2026-09-11]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM (2026-09-11)
13. S&P 500 index level — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500 (2026-09-13)
14. Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement ¶3 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260729a.htm (2026-07-29)
15. Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement ¶2 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260729a.htm (2026-07-29)
16. Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement ¶6 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260729a.htm (2026-07-29)
17. Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement ¶5 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260729a.htm (2026-07-29)
18. Waller, The Economic Outlook and Some Comments on My Policy Communication ¶15 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20260903a.htm (2026-09-03)
19. Waller, The Economic Outlook and Some Comments on My Policy Communication ¶3 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20260903a.htm (2026-09-03)
20. Waller, The Economic Outlook and Some Comments on My Policy Communication ¶20 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20260903a.htm (2026-09-03)
21. Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement ¶4 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260729a.htm (2026-07-29)
22. DGS2.chg_3m = DGS2[2026-09-10] - DGS2[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS2 (2026-09-11)
23. DGS2.latest = DGS2[2026-09-10] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS2 (2026-09-11)
24. DGS10.chg_3m = DGS10[2026-09-10] - DGS10[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS10 (2026-09-11)
25. DGS10.latest = DGS10[2026-09-10] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS10 (2026-09-11)
26. DGS30.chg_3m = DGS30[2026-09-10] - DGS30[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS30 (2026-09-11)
27. DGS30.hi_52w = max(DGS30[2025-09-15..2026-09-10]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS30 (2026-09-11)
28. T10Y2Y.chg_3m = T10Y2Y[2026-09-11] - T10Y2Y[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y (2026-09-11)
29. T10Y2Y.latest = T10Y2Y[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y (2026-09-11)
30. T10Y2Y.lo_52w = min(T10Y2Y[2025-09-15..2026-09-11]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y (2026-09-11)
31. DGS2.chg_12m = DGS2[2026-09-10] - DGS2[2025-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS2 (2026-09-11)
32. DGS10.chg_12m = DGS10[2026-09-10] - DGS10[2025-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS10 (2026-09-11)
33. DFII10.chg_3m = DFII10[2026-09-10] - DFII10[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFII10 (2026-09-11)
34. DFII10.latest = DFII10[2026-09-10] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFII10 (2026-09-11)
35. T10YIE.chg_3m = T10YIE[2026-09-11] - T10YIE[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIE (2026-09-11)
36. T10YIE.latest = T10YIE[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIE (2026-09-11)
37. DFEDTARU.latest = DFEDTARU[2026-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU (2026-09-11)
38. DFEDTARU.chg_12m = DFEDTARU[2026-09-11] - DFEDTARU[2025-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU (2026-09-11)
39. BAMLC0A0CM.chg_3m = BAMLC0A0CM[2026-09-10] - BAMLC0A0CM[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-10)
40. BAMLC0A0CM.latest = BAMLC0A0CM[2026-09-10] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-10)
41. BAMLC0A0CM.lo_52w = min(BAMLC0A0CM[2025-09-15..2026-09-10]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-10)
42. BAMLC0A0CM.hi_52w = max(BAMLC0A0CM[2025-09-15..2026-09-10]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A0CM (2026-09-10)
43. BAMLH0A0HYM2.chg_3m = BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-09-10] - BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-09-10)
44. BAMLH0A0HYM2.latest = BAMLH0A0HYM2[2026-09-10] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-09-10)
45. BAMLH0A0HYM2.lo_52w = min(BAMLH0A0HYM2[2025-09-15..2026-09-10]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 (2026-09-10)
46. BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV.pct_3m = (BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-09-10] - BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-06-11]) / BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-06-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV (2026-09-10)
47. BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV.pct_12m = (BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2026-09-10] - BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2025-09-11]) / BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV[2025-09-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLCC0A0CMTRIV (2026-09-10)
48. BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV.pct_3m = (BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-09-10] - BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-06-11]) / BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-06-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV (2026-09-10)
49. BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV.pct_12m = (BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2026-09-10] - BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2025-09-11]) / BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV[2025-09-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLHYH0A0HYM2TRIV (2026-09-10)
50. DCOILBRENTEU.chg_3m = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-09] - DCOILBRENTEU[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-10)
51. DCOILBRENTEU.latest = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-09] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-10)
52. DCOILWTICO.chg_3m = DCOILWTICO[2026-09-09] - DCOILWTICO[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILWTICO (2026-09-10)
53. DCOILWTICO.latest = DCOILWTICO[2026-09-09] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILWTICO (2026-09-10)
54. DCOILBRENTEU.chg_1m = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-09] - DCOILBRENTEU[2026-08-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-10)
55. DCOILWTICO.chg_1m = DCOILWTICO[2026-09-09] - DCOILWTICO[2026-08-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILWTICO (2026-09-10)
56. DCOILBRENTEU.chg_12m = DCOILBRENTEU[2026-09-09] - DCOILBRENTEU[2025-09-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-10)
57. DCOILBRENTEU.hi_52w = max(DCOILBRENTEU[2025-09-15..2026-09-09]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-10)
58. DCOILBRENTEU.lo_52w = min(DCOILBRENTEU[2025-09-15..2026-09-09]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU (2026-09-10)
59. DTWEXBGS.pct_3m = (DTWEXBGS[2026-09-04] - DTWEXBGS[2026-06-11]) / DTWEXBGS[2026-06-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXBGS (2026-09-08)
60. DTWEXBGS.latest = DTWEXBGS[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXBGS (2026-09-08)
61. DTWEXBGS.pct_12m = (DTWEXBGS[2026-09-04] - DTWEXBGS[2025-09-11]) / DTWEXBGS[2025-09-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXBGS (2026-09-08)
62. DTWEXAFEGS.pct_3m = (DTWEXAFEGS[2026-09-04] - DTWEXAFEGS[2026-06-11]) / DTWEXAFEGS[2026-06-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXAFEGS (2026-09-08)
63. DTWEXAFEGS.latest = DTWEXAFEGS[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXAFEGS (2026-09-08)
64. DTWEXAFEGS.pct_12m = (DTWEXAFEGS[2026-09-04] - DTWEXAFEGS[2025-09-11]) / DTWEXAFEGS[2025-09-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXAFEGS (2026-09-08)
65. CPIAUCSL.pct_3m = (CPIAUCSL[2026-08-01] - CPIAUCSL[2026-06-01]) / CPIAUCSL[2026-06-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL (2026-09-11)
66. CPIAUCSL.pct_12m = (CPIAUCSL[2026-08-01] - CPIAUCSL[2025-09-01]) / CPIAUCSL[2025-09-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL (2026-09-11)
67. CPIAUCSL.latest = CPIAUCSL[2026-08-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL (2026-09-11)
68. CPIAUCSL.hi_52w = max(CPIAUCSL[2025-11-01..2026-08-01]) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL (2026-09-11)
69. PCEPILFE.pct_3m = (PCEPILFE[2026-07-01] - PCEPILFE[2026-06-01]) / PCEPILFE[2026-06-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPILFE (2026-08-26)
70. PCEPILFE.pct_12m = (PCEPILFE[2026-07-01] - PCEPILFE[2025-09-01]) / PCEPILFE[2025-09-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPILFE (2026-08-26)
71. GDPNOW.latest = GDPNOW[2026-07-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPNOW (2026-09-10)
72. GDPNOW.chg_3m = GDPNOW[2026-07-01] - GDPNOW[2026-04-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPNOW (2026-09-10)
73. PAYEMS.chg_3m = PAYEMS[2026-08-01] - PAYEMS[2026-06-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS (2026-09-04)
74. PAYEMS.latest = PAYEMS[2026-08-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS (2026-09-04)
75. UNRATE.chg_3m = UNRATE[2026-08-01] - UNRATE[2026-06-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE (2026-09-04)
76. UNRATE.latest = UNRATE[2026-08-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE (2026-09-04)
77. UMCSENT.pct_3m = (UMCSENT[2026-07-01] - UMCSENT[2026-06-01]) / UMCSENT[2026-06-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UMCSENT (2026-07-31)
78. UMCSENT.latest = UMCSENT[2026-07-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UMCSENT (2026-07-31)
79. GB10Y.latest = GB10Y[2026-09-09] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-11)
80. GB10Y.chg_3m = GB10Y[2026-09-09] - GB10Y[2026-06-11] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-11)
81. GB5Y.chg_3m = GB5Y[2026-09-09] - GB5Y[2026-06-11] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-11)
82. GB20Y.chg_3m = GB20Y[2026-09-09] - GB20Y[2026-06-11] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-11)
83. GB10Y.chg_12m = GB10Y[2026-09-09] - GB10Y[2025-09-11] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-11)
84. GBPOL.latest = GBPOL[2026-09-10] — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/ (2026-09-11)
85. Bank Rate maintained at 3.75% - July 2026 Monetary Policy Summary and Minutes ¶0 — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-summary-and-minutes/2026/july-2026 (2026-07-30)
86. Bank Rate maintained at 3.75% - July 2026 Monetary Policy Summary and Minutes ¶13 — https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-summary-and-minutes/2026/july-2026 (2026-07-30)
87. DEXUSUK.chg_3m = DEXUSUK[2026-09-04] - DEXUSUK[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXUSUK (2026-09-08)
88. EA10Y.chg_3m = EA10Y[2026-09-10] - EA10Y[2026-06-11] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-13)
89. EA10Y.latest = EA10Y[2026-09-10] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-13)
90. EA2Y.chg_3m = EA2Y[2026-09-10] - EA2Y[2026-06-11] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-13)
91. EA2Y.latest = EA2Y[2026-09-10] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-13)
92. EA2Y.chg_12m = EA2Y[2026-09-10] - EA2Y[2025-09-11] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-13)
93. EAPOL.chg_3m = EAPOL[2026-09-11] - EAPOL[2026-06-11] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-13)
94. EAPOL.latest = EAPOL[2026-09-11] — https://data.ecb.europa.eu/ (2026-09-13)
95. Monetary policy decisions ¶1 — https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2026/html/ecb.mp260910~314e508016.en.html (2026-09-10)
96. CP0000EZ19M086NEST.pct_12m = (CP0000EZ19M086NEST[2026-07-01] - CP0000EZ19M086NEST[2025-09-01]) / CP0000EZ19M086NEST[2025-09-01] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CP0000EZ19M086NEST (2026-08-19)
97. DEXUSEU.chg_3m = DEXUSEU[2026-09-04] - DEXUSEU[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXUSEU (2026-09-08)
98. JP2Y.chg_3m = JP2Y[2026-09-10] - JP2Y[2026-06-11] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-13)
99. JP2Y.latest = JP2Y[2026-09-10] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-13)
100. JP10Y.chg_3m = JP10Y[2026-09-10] - JP10Y[2026-06-11] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-13)
101. JP10Y.latest = JP10Y[2026-09-10] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-13)
102. JP30Y.chg_3m = JP30Y[2026-09-10] - JP30Y[2026-06-11] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-13)
103. JP30Y.latest = JP30Y[2026-09-10] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-13)
104. JP10Y.chg_12m = JP10Y[2026-09-10] - JP10Y[2025-09-11] — https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/ (2026-09-13)
105. Bank of Japan monetary policy decision, 2026-07-31 ¶3 — https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/mpmdeci/mpr_2026/k260731a.pdf (2026-07-31)
106. Bank of Japan monetary policy decision, 2026-06-16 ¶4 — https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/mpmdeci/mpr_2026/k260616a.pdf (2026-06-16)
107. DEXJPUS.chg_3m = DEXJPUS[2026-09-04] - DEXJPUS[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXJPUS (2026-09-08)
108. NIKKEI225.pct_3m = (NIKKEI225[2026-09-11] - NIKKEI225[2026-06-11]) / NIKKEI225[2026-06-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NIKKEI225 (2026-09-11)
109. CA10Y.chg_3m = CA10Y[2026-09-10] - CA10Y[2026-06-11] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-13)
110. CA10Y.latest = CA10Y[2026-09-10] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-13)
111. CA2Y.chg_3m = CA2Y[2026-09-10] - CA2Y[2026-06-11] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-13)
112. CA2Y.latest = CA2Y[2026-09-10] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-13)
113. CA2Y.chg_12m = CA2Y[2026-09-10] - CA2Y[2025-09-11] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-13)
114. CAPOL.latest = CAPOL[2026-09-08] — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/valet/ (2026-09-13)
115. Bank of Canada maintains the policy rate at 2¼% ¶3 — https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2026/09/fad-press-release-2026-09-02/ (2026-09-02)
116. LRUNTTTTCAM156S.latest = LRUNTTTTCAM156S[2026-07-01] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LRUNTTTTCAM156S (2026-08-17)
117. DEXCAUS.latest = DEXCAUS[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXCAUS (2026-09-08)
118. BAMLEMCBPIOAS.chg_3m = BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-09-10] - BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMCBPIOAS (2026-09-10)
119. BAMLEMCBPIOAS.latest = BAMLEMCBPIOAS[2026-09-10] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMCBPIOAS (2026-09-10)
120. BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS.chg_3m = BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-09-10] - BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS (2026-09-10)
121. BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS.latest = BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS[2026-09-10] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLEMHBHYCRPIOAS (2026-09-10)
122. DTWEXEMEGS.pct_3m = (DTWEXEMEGS[2026-09-04] - DTWEXEMEGS[2026-06-11]) / DTWEXEMEGS[2026-06-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXEMEGS (2026-09-08)
123. DEXCHUS.latest = DEXCHUS[2026-09-04] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXCHUS (2026-09-08)
124. DEXKOUS.chg_3m = DEXKOUS[2026-09-04] - DEXKOUS[2026-06-11] — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXKOUS (2026-09-08)
125. VXEEMCLS.pct_3m = (VXEEMCLS[2026-09-10] - VXEEMCLS[2026-06-11]) / VXEEMCLS[2026-06-11] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/VXEEMCLS (2026-09-10)
126. VXEEMCLS.pct_1w = (VXEEMCLS[2026-09-10] - VXEEMCLS[2026-09-04]) / VXEEMCLS[2026-09-04] * 100 — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/VXEEMCLS (2026-09-10)
127. Modifying the Scope of Products of Canada Subject to the Additional Duties Imposed to Offset Canadian Discrimination Against the United States with Respect to Motor Vehicles ¶4 — https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/09/modifying-the-scope-of-products-of-canada-subject-to-the-additional-duties-imposed-to-offset-canadian-discrimination-against-the-united-states-with-respect-to-motor-vehicles/ (2026-09-08)
128. Modifying the Scope of Products of Canada Subject to the Additional Duties Imposed to Offset Canadian Discrimination Against the United States with Respect to Motor Vehicles ¶7 — https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/09/modifying-the-scope-of-products-of-canada-subject-to-the-additional-duties-imposed-to-offset-canadian-discrimination-against-the-united-states-with-respect-to-motor-vehicles/ (2026-09-08)
129. Modifying the Scope of Products of Canada Subject to the Additional Duties Imposed to Offset Canadian Discrimination Against the United States with Respect to Motor Vehicles ¶12 — https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/09/modifying-the-scope-of-products-of-canada-subject-to-the-additional-duties-imposed-to-offset-canadian-discrimination-against-the-united-states-with-respect-to-motor-vehicles/ (2026-09-08)
130. Adjusting Certain Delegations Under the Defense Production Act ¶5 — https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/09/adjusting-certain-delegations-under-the-defense-production-act-e2de/ (2026-09-08)